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Central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets may, under some conditions, stimulate exports
and retard imports. In the past few years, this issue has moved to center stage because of the foreign
exchange policies of China. China has regularly intervened to prevent the RMB from appreciating
relative to other currencies, and over the same period has developed large global and bilateral trade
surpluses. Numerous public officials and commentators argue that China has engaged in impermissible
"currency manipulation," and various proposals for stiff action against China have been advanced.
This paper clarifies the theoretical relationship between exchange rate policy and international trade,
and addresses the question of what content can be given to the concept of "currency manipulation"
as a measure that may impair the commitments made in trade agreements. Our conclusions are at odds
with much of what is currently being said by proponents of counter-measures against China. For example,
it is often asserted that China's currency policies have real effects that are equivalent to an export subsidy.
In fact, however, if prices are flexible the effect of exchange rate intervention parallels that of a uniform
import tariff and export subsidy, which will have no real effect on trade, an implication of Lerner's
symmetry theorem. With sticky prices, the real effects of exchange rate intervention and the translation
of that intervention into trade-policy equivalents depend critically on how traded goods and services
are priced. The real effects of China's policies are potentially quite complex, are not readily translated
into trade-policy equivalents, and are dependent on the time frame over which they are evaluated (because













A close relationship exists between monetary policy and international trade. Domestic monetary
stimulus can enhance export opportunities for trading partners, just as contractionary policy can
reduce them. Foreign exchange controls for balance of payments purposes can impede exports.1
Central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets may, under some conditions, stimulate ex-
ports and retard imports or vice-versa, depending on the direction of intervention.
In the past few years, these issues have moved to center stage because of the foreign exchange
policies of China. China has regularly intervened in international exchange markets to prevent the
RMB2 from appreciating relative to other currencies, and over the same period has developed large
global and bilateral trade surpluses. Numerous public o¢ cials and commentators argue that China
has engaged in impermissible ￿currency manipulation.￿ President Elect Obama stated in October,
2008, for example, that China￿ s current trade surplus is ￿directly related to its manipulation of
its currency￿ s value.￿He concurrently promised to ￿beef up U.S. enforcement e⁄orts against unfair
trade practices.￿ 3 Various proposals for action against China have been put forward in Washington
over the past few years, running the gamut from insisting that the Treasury Department refer the
matter to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), requiring the United States Trade Representa-
tive to bring a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and treating China￿ s
alleged currency manipulation as a source of dumping or countervailable subsidies that would per-
mit the imposition of antidumping or countervailing duties on Chinese imports that ￿materially
injure￿competing U.S. industries.
The prominence of the current rift over China￿ s exchange market intervention o⁄ers an oppor-
tunity for a careful assessment of the connection between exchange rate policy and trade policy.
Although we will devote considerable attention to the particulars of China￿ s situation, we wish to
emphasize that this is not simply a paper about this potentially transitory source of international
tension. Rather, we seek to clarify more broadly the theoretical relationship between exchange rate
policy and international trade, as well as the question of what content can be given to the concept of
￿currency manipulation￿as a measure that may impair the commitments made in trade agreements.
The analysis goes to the proper relationship between IMF obligations and WTO obligations, to
the question whether trade measures have a role in the enforcement of IMF obligations, and to the
1The GATT, now incorporated into WTO law, permits the use of trade restrictions when ￿necessary￿to protect
foreign exchange reserves, even if those measures would otherwise contravene GATT commitments. See GATT Art.
XII, Art. XVIIIB (applicable to developing countries). Over the history of the WTO and the GATT before it, a
frequent source of tension has concerned the use of import restrictions ostensibly for the purpose of conserving scarce
foreign exchange. Many member nations have employed such restrictions at one time or another, and numerous
informal and formal disputes arose within the system. Two of these disputes resulted in rulings that balance of
payments restrictions had been invoked or misused in a fashion that impermissibly restricted trade. See Republic
of Korea ￿Restrictions on Beef, L/6503, 6504 & 6505, adopted by the GATT Council November 7, 1989; India ￿
Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R, adopted by
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body September 22, 1999.
2The Chinese currency is also known as the yuan or the renminbi (RMB). We will use the term RMB throughout
for consistency.
3See http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed7/idUSN2949036520081030.
1broader question whether trade measures are an appropriate response to exchange market policies
that may impair market access commitments under trade agreements.
Our conclusions raise questions about much of what is currently being said in Washington. For
example, it is often asserted that China￿ s currency policies have real e⁄ects that are equivalent to
an export subsidy. In fact, however, if prices are ￿ exible the e⁄ect of exchange rate intervention
parallels that of a uniform import tari⁄ and export subsidy, which will have no real e⁄ect on
trade. With sticky prices, the real e⁄ects of exchange rate intervention and the translation of
that intervention into trade-policy equivalents depend critically on how traded goods and services
are priced. The real e⁄ects of China￿ s policies are thus potentially quite complex, are not readily
translated into trade-policy equivalents, and are dependent on the time frame over which they are
evaluated (because prices are less ￿sticky￿over a longer time frame).
Section 2 provides some further background on China￿ s current policies and the criticisms that
have been leveled against them. Section 3 addresses the economic issues, focusing on the question
whether exchange rate policies have the potential to frustrate trade commitments, and the task of
distinguishing acceptable foreign exchange policies from unacceptable policies. Section 4 reviews
the existing legal constraints on currency ￿manipulation,￿and the most prominent proposals for
additional legal measures now pending, analyzing the extant and proposed options from both an
economic and legal perspective. Section 5 concludes.
2 Chinese Policy and Its Critics
Governments have intervened in foreign exchange markets for decades. In any system of ￿xed
exchange rates, the price of a currency in terms of other currencies set by the government (termed
the ￿peg￿ ) may prove inconsistent with the market valuation of the currency. As a result, exchange
traders may demand more of it than the available supply at the ￿xed rate, or vice-versa. When such
pressures become substantial, governments must either revalue the currency, or intervene in the
exchange market by buying the currency (to soak up an excess supply) or selling the currency (to
relieve an excess demand). The need for intervention diminishes greatly, of course, when currencies
are allowed to ￿￿ oat￿against each other in accordance with free market forces. Most of the major
currencies presently, including the dollar, the Euro, the yen and the British pound, now ￿ oat.
Notwithstanding China￿ s enormous and growing role in world trade,4 the RMB does not ￿ oat.
It was pegged from 1994 until mid-2005 at a constant rate of 8:28 RMB to the dollar. In response
to pressures for upward revaluation, China shifted in 2005 to a policy of loosely pegging the RMB
to a basket of major currencies. Following this shift in policy the RMB has appreciated against the
dollar, and the current RMB/dollar exchange rate (as of December, 2008) stands at roughly 6.83.
Despite the recent appreciation against the dollar, however, a recent ￿blue ribbon panel￿report to
4In 2006, for example, Chinese exports were just under $1 trillion. See PRC General Administration of
Customs, China￿ s Customs Statistics, summarized online at http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html.
The European Union now imports more goods from China than from any other trading partner. See
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/china/index_en.htm.
2the incoming Obama administration concludes that the RMB is still ￿substantially undervalued.￿ 5
And over the same period, the RMB generally depreciated against the Euro, falling from 10.06
in June 2005 to 10.79 in June 2008. With the sharp depreciation of the Euro due to the recent
￿nancial crisis, however, the RMB has appreciated and the RMB/Euro exchange rate presently
stands at 9.78 (as of December 2008).
Throughout this period, China has intervened actively in foreign exchange markets to prevent
the RMB from appreciating faster, selling RMB and buying other major currencies (mostly dollars).
As a result of this policy, its foreign exchange reserves grew from $403 billion at the end of 2003 to
over $1:5 trillion at the end of 2007.6 Reports from earlier this year suggest that its reserves had
grown to roughly $1.9 trillion by September.7
The e⁄ect of such exchange market intervention on international trade, and on measures of trade
￿ ows such as the trade surplus or de￿cit, is a matter of some theoretical and empirical controversy
as will become clear in Section 3. For now, we start with an obvious and politically salient fact.
If a government intervenes in exchange markets to drive down the price of its currency in relation
to other major currencies, and all else remains equal, its exports can become cheaper on world
markets (it may take fewer units of foreign currency to buy them) and its imports can become
more expensive in its domestic market (it may take more units of domestic currency to purchase
foreign goods). Following this simple observation, it is often suggested that the policy pursued by
China must increase its exports and decrease its imports.
One obvious di¢ culty with this account is that it ignores the e⁄ect of exchange rate movements
on other prices in the global economy (i.e., other things may not be equal). Indeed, it is possible
to imagine that other prices adjust to o⁄set completely the exchange rate movement, as we will
discuss in Section 3. An e⁄ect on trade from exchange market intervention thus requires not simply
a movement in the nominal exchange rate, but a change in the real exchange rate ￿the nominal rate
adjusted for the purchasing power of currencies.8 The extent to which exchange market intervention
will a⁄ect real exchange rates is an empirical question, depending on such factors as the ability of
other prices to adjust and the speed by which adjustment takes place.
Another di¢ culty with the simple argument above is that it implicitly presumes that all traded
goods are priced in the currency of the country that produces them. In fact, exporters may price
their goods in the currencies of the markets into which they sell, or perhaps in some third currency
(such as dollars or Euros). The e⁄ect of exchange market intervention in these scenarios becomes
more subtle and complex.
Section 3 will have much more to say about such matters. For the moment, however, su¢ ce
it to say that China￿ s foreign exchange policies have been accompanied by dramatic changes in
its international trade position (whether those policies have caused those changes is, to be sure,
5See BNA International Trade Daily, December 16, 2008.
6See http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20080111/chinas-foreign-exchange-reserves-higher.htm.
7See http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/14/business/AS-China-Foreign-Reserves.php.
8An alternative de￿nition of the real exchange rate that is sometimes employed is the relative price of tradeables to
non-tradeables. The points we emphasize in this paper are not sensitive to the choice between these two de￿nitions,
and so in what follows we stick with the de￿nition of the real exchange rate provided in the text.
3another question). China￿ s global trade surplus rose slowly (and unevenly) from $16:7 billion in
1995 to $32:1 billion in 2004. But in 2005 its global surplus more than tripled to $102 billion,
followed by another 75% increase in 2006 to $177:5 billion9 and another 48% increase to $262.2
billion in 2007.10
Of perhaps lesser economic signi￿cance, yet surely of great political signi￿cance, China￿ s trade
surplus with the United States has risen steadily from $33:8 billion in 1995 to $256:2 billion in 2007.
The latter ￿gure re￿ ects U.S. imports from China in the amount of $321:4 billion and exports of
only $65:2 billion11. China￿ s trade surplus with Europe follows a rather similar pattern, reaching
159:0 billion Euros in 2007.12 In light of these ￿gures, it is no surprise that ministers on both sides
of the Atlantic have expressed concern about China￿ s policies and have urged China to allow the
RMB to appreciate.13
These concerns are voiced by more than just politicians and their industry constituencies. C.
Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics recently suggested that the
RMB must appreciate approximately 40% against the dollar to correct current ￿global imbalances,￿
and urged the United States to take multilateral and if necessary unilateral action to pressure China
to change its ways.14 Lael Brainard of the Brookings Institution has also been critical of China￿ s
policies,15 as has the prominent international economist Michael Mussa, now based at the Peterson
Institute.16
Thus, from the Administration to Congress to the think tanks, the debate in Washington seems
not to be over the existence of a problem or its potential seriousness, but over the best policy
response. We will discuss policy options in some detail in Section 4, but as a preliminary to that
analysis we turn to some basic economic points.
3 Economic Analysis
How is the global economy a⁄ected when the government of China engages in exchange rate in-
tervention to prevent the RMB from appreciating, and what is the appropriate response from
China￿ s trading partners? The IMF and the GATT/WTO were created to address the interna-
tional spillovers or ￿externalities￿that might arise when governments choose their economic policies
9Note that China became a member of the WTO in 2001. This event had no obvious impact on China￿ s trade
surplus ￿the surplus in 1997 and 1998 was higher that in any of the years 2002-2004. See PRC General Administration




13See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Europe Trade Gap with China Soars, Fuels G-7 Tensions, October 18, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a9afSzjz4PQs.
14C. Fred Bergsten, Statement before the Hearing on US Economic Relations with China: Strategies and Op-
tions on Exchange Rates and Market Access, Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance,
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban A⁄airs, United States Senate, May 23, 2007, available online at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchID=747.
15Lael Brainard, Global Views: Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2007, June 14, 2007,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0614globaleconomics_brainard.aspx.
16Michael Mussa, IMF Surveillance over China￿ s Exchange Rate Policy, October 19, 2007 (mimeo).
4unilaterally, and if properly functioning these international institutions should serve to internalize
those externalities and thereby bring the world to the international e¢ ciency frontier. To determine
the proper policy response by other nations (or by international institutions) to intervention in the
foreign exchange market, it is therefore ￿rst necessary to identify the international externalities
that may be associated with such intervention. We begin by observing that these international
externalities might be of two general types, relating either to trade imbalances or trade volumes.
The IMF has traditionally been assigned the role of handling global trade (or current account)
imbalances, when those imbalances are associated with ￿fundamental misalignment￿or ￿manip-
ulation￿ of the exchange rate.17 In IMF (2007a), the terms ￿fundamental misalignment￿ and
￿manipulation￿are explained, respectively, in this way:
1)When the underlying current account is not in equilibrium (which may be due to
exchange rate policies but also to unsustainable domestic policies or to market imper-
fections), the exchange rate is ￿fundamentally misaligned.￿In other words, fundamental
exchange rate misalignment, an important indicator of external instability under the
2007 decision, is a deviation of the real e⁄ective exchange rate from its equilibrium
level, that is, the level consistent with a current account (stripped of cyclical and other
temporary factors) in line with economic fundamentals.
and
2) The IMF￿ s Articles of Agreement provide that member countries shall ￿avoid
manipulating exchange rates ... to prevent e⁄ective balance of payments adjustment
or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.￿ But the Fund had
provided little guidance on what constitutes such exchange rate manipulation. The
2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance that the IMF￿ s Executive Board approved on
June 15 provides guidance to the IMF￿ s 185 member countries on the type of behavior
that is at issue.
The 2007 decision provides that a member would be ￿acting inconsistently with
Article IV, Section 1 (iii),￿ if the Fund determined it was both engaging in policies
that are targeted at and actually a⁄ect the level of exchange rate, which could mean
either causing the exchange rate to move or preventing it from moving; and doing so
￿for the purpose of securing fundamental exchange rate misalignment in the form of an
undervalued exchange rate￿in order ￿to increase net exports.￿
We note that the IMF de￿nes both fundamental misalignment and manipulation of the exchange
rate in terms of the e⁄ects on the current account and net exports, and is in this sense concerned
with the impacts of exchange rate policies on trade imbalances.18
17The precise nature and extent of the ￿problem￿ associated with global imbalances that would warrant some
response is itself a point of controversy among economists, but it is often described as the risk associated with a rapid
reversal of the imbalances accompanied by sudden and large exchange rate movements (see, for example, Cline, 2005
and Rogo⁄, 2006).
18Exchange rate policies are de￿ned by the IMF as follows:
5By contrast, the negotiated reciprocal market access commitments that lie at the core of the
GATT/WTO are not seen as a means of correcting trade imbalances, but have instead been widely
interpreted as a means of reducing policy barriers to trade and thereby expanding trade volumes
to more e¢ cient levels.19 Consistent with this interpretation, formal economic models of trade
agreements, without exception, take trade balances as exogenous and therefore una⁄ected by trade
agreements.20 It may therefore be said that the economics literature on trade agreements proceeds
on the basis that trade agreements are not concerned with negotiating trade balances. Rather, it
is generally accepted that the traditional concern of the GATT/WTO has been with the impacts
of commercial policies on trade volumes.
The distinction between the traditional concerns of the IMF and those of the GATT/WTO
provides a crucial starting point for the discussion that follows. In particular, we do not undertake
our analysis from a position which sees the IMF as a failed institution and asks the WTO to ￿take
over￿the task of handling all aspects of international cooperation over exchange rate policies: such
a position would imply a fundamental shift in the limits of the WTO mandate. Rather, we maintain
the assumption that the IMF is the appropriate institution for addressing the impacts of exchange
rate policies on trade imbalances. In this way, our economic and legal analysis presumes that there
will be no fundamental change in the role of the WTO. The question we address is then how the
WTO should approach the possible impacts of exchange rate policies on trade volumes.
Admittedly, this approach implies that our paper cannot speak to all corners of the policy
debate on currency manipulation, because some in this debate argue that the IMF is a failed
institution and that the WTO should be called upon to expand its mandate and achieve what
the IMF cannot.21 Nevertheless, even with this more limited focus, our paper still speaks to one
As is evident from the section of the 1977 Decision entitled ￿Principles of Fund Surveillance over
Exchange Rate Policies,￿exchange rate policies have been understood by the Executive Board as em-
bracing a broad range of external policies that are speci￿cally pursued for balance of payments purposes;
e.g. the introduction of or substantial modi￿cation for balance of payments purposes of restrictions on,
or incentives for, the in￿ ow or out￿ ow of capital. Moreover, to the extent that certain domestic policies
are also pursued for balance of payments purposes, the indicators suggest that these would also be
included; speci￿cally, the pursuit, for balance of payments purposes, of monetary and other domestic
￿nancial policies that provide abnormal encouragement or discouragement to capital ￿ ows. However,
domestic policies pursued for these speci￿c purposes should be distinguished from domestic policies that
only have this e⁄ect. The latter category would not be considered exchange rate policies within the
meaning of the 1977 Decision. ( IMF, 2006a, footnote 22).
19The underlying ￿problem￿that gives rise to the need for a trade agreement has been broadly interpreted in the
economics literature as deriving from the international cost-shifting motives to which governments succumb when
they make unilateral trade policy choices (with cost-shifting typically occuring through terms-of-trade movements),
but domestic commitment problems have also been suggested (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, for a recent review of
this literature).
20Most models of real commercial policy analysis more generally also adopt the assumption that trade balances are
exogenous to the choice of commercial policies, though there are exceptions (see, for example, Corden, 1985, Mussa,
1974 and 1985, and Razin and Svensson, 1983). As it happens, the leading macro-economic analyses of the potential
gains from international monetary policy coordination maintain the assumption that trade balances are exogenously
￿xed as well (see Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2002 and Corsetti and Pesenti, 2007). On the other hand, the idea that
(exogenous) changes in trade imbalances may impact the performance of trade agreements has been formally studied
by Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and most recently by Agur (2008).
21For a recent articulation of this position, see Subramanian (2008).
6very important dimension of the policy debate, namely, whether and under what circumstances
exchange rate policies can be seen either to impair WTO commitments or to a⁄ord a basis for
WTO-consistent unilateral responses.
As noted brie￿ y in the previous section, proposals calling for action to deal with the perceived
impacts of China￿ s exchange rate policies include many that involve the WTO. Some of these
proposals would seek a ruling against China by the WTO on some basis, while others envision
unilateral responses that nevertheless raise issues of WTO consistency. But for each of these
alternative proposals, a common ￿and critical ￿ingredient for practical implementation involves
an analysis which would translate China￿ s exchange rate policies (and in particular the magnitude
of its exchange rate ￿misalignment￿ ) into equivalent real trade policies that could then be more
readily evaluated under the rules of the WTO, either to identify the appropriate response by the
WTO itself or to assess the WTO-consistency of unilateral responses. The economic discussion to
follow will explore in some detail a number of speci￿c issues that arise in this analysis. But before
turning to that discussion, we ￿rst describe two implications of the distinct focus of the IMF and
the WTO that provide guidance for what follows.22
First, one simply cannot presume that the IMF￿ s de￿nition of ￿exchange rate misalignment￿
as reproduced in the quoted passage above, which is derived from an analysis of trade imbalances,
is a useful starting point for assessing the impact of exchange practices on WTO obligations. As
an illustration of this point, consider the question whether exchange practices of China can be
deemed to impair the market access (tari⁄) concessions made by China when it acceded to the
WTO in 2001 (we discuss legal aspects of this issue in Section 4). To answer this question, a crucial
legal issue is whether China￿ s exchange rate policies could have been reasonably anticipated at the
time of its negotiated tari⁄ concessions. But of course, the IMF-based calculation of misalignment,
being designed for a completely di⁄erent purpose, does not re￿ ect this information (i.e., it makes
no attempt to measure only that portion of the misalignment that could not have been reasonably
anticipated at the time that China￿ s tari⁄ commitments were negotiated).
As this illustration suggests, the correct de￿nition of ￿exchange rate misalignment￿ for the
purpose of characterizing the appropriate WTO response to exchange practices or the WTO-
consistency of a unilateral response would depend on the legal claim being made within the context
of the WTO, and need bear no relation to the IMF de￿nition of misalignment. This point ap-
plies as well to all of the alternative approaches to de￿ning exchange rate misalignment, which are
based on some notion of ￿purchasing power parity.￿ 23 The various approaches to the assessment of
equilibrium exchange rates will yield di⁄erent results, but none of them can be presumed as a gen-
22As we discuss further in Section 4, policy proposals that focus on the use of GATT Article XV raise as well
the explicit issue of whether exchange rate policies frustrate the ￿intent￿of the GATT/WTO. Our distinction noted
above between the concerns of the IMF and those of the GATT/WTO has an additional and direct implication in
the context of these proposals: exchange rate policies that raise problems at the IMF would not necessarily frustrate
the intent of the GATT/WTO, while exhange rate policies that did not raise concerns for the IMF could nevertheless
frustrate the intent of the GATT/WTO.
23For a description of the major approaches to determining the equilibrium value of the exchange rate and the
magnitude of exchange rate misalignments, see McCown et.al. (2007).
7eral matter to provide useful guidance for thinking about the question whether exchange practices
impair WTO commitments. We return to consider this issue further in Section 4.
A second implication of the distinct concerns between the IMF and the WTO relates to the way
in which exchange rate policies should be translated into equivalent real commercial policies for
the purpose of WTO evaluation, once the appropriate magnitude of exchange rate misalignment
has been determined for this purpose. Simply put, we wish to isolate the trade volume e⁄ects of
exchange rate misalignment from the trade balance e⁄ects, because as we indicated above the latter
are the traditional concern of the IMF while the former are most closely tied to the traditional
concerns of the GATT/WTO and are hence our focus here. In what follows we therefore work
with models that maintain balanced trade, not because we are asserting that trade imbalances are
necessarily una⁄ected by exchange rate movements, but because we believe that those a⁄ects are
simply not germane to the evaluation of appropriate WTO or WTO-consistent actions.24
To describe some of the further di¢ culties involved in translating exchange rate policies into
equivalent real commercial policies for the purpose of judging WTO consistency, we focus for the
remainder of this section on the hypothetical problem of translating a given devaluation of the
Chinese RMB into an equivalent package of real commercial policies. We interpret this devaluation
as capturing in a stylized way the ￿exchange rate misalignment￿ that China is being asked to
address, and we abstract until Section 4 from the prior issue raised above concerning how to
measure the magnitude of this devaluation (the magnitude of exchange rate misalignment) in an
appropriate manner for the purpose at hand.25
In translating the e⁄ects of exchange market intervention into equivalent real commercial policy
measures, it is helpful to begin in an environment of fully ￿￿ exible prices￿and then move to an
environment with ￿sticky prices.￿ We thus divide the analysis to consider these two cases.
3.1 Flexible Prices
We begin under the assumption that prices are fully ￿ exible, an assumption that in e⁄ect captures
the ￿long run.￿ The ￿ exible price assumption is standard in economic models of international trade
agreements (see, for example, the models surveyed in Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, Ch. 2).
The justi￿cation for this assumption when used in the economic analysis of trade agreements is
not a belief that all prices are fully ￿ exible at every moment in time. Rather, it is justi￿ed by the
notion that trade agreements are primarily designed to address longer-term international problems
that arise and persist over horizons for which a ￿ exible-price assumption seems reasonable, such
as the desire by nations to obtain long term improvements in their access to foreign markets. Put
24Logically, of course, exchange rate policies may impact trade volumes without impacting trade balances, but
exchange rate policies that impact trade balances must also impact trade volumes. Here we explore the impacts of
exchange rate policies on trade volumes under the assumption that trade remains balanced, isolating these trade
volume e⁄ects from any further e⁄ects that would be associated with the trade balance implications of exchange rate
policies. As described in the text, we do so on the grounds that the latter are germane to the IMF, not the WTO.
25In reality, the policy issue is not that China￿ s exchange intervention is devaluing the RMB, but that its intervention
is preventing appreciation in the RMB that would otherwise occur. For the points we make below, this distinction is
immaterial, and so for pedagogical reasons we consider the simple case of a devaluation.
8di⁄erently, the ￿GATT clock￿ticks in years or even decades, not at business cycle frequencies, and
at this frequency most prices are likely to be ￿ exible. Of course, trade agreements may build in
￿ exibility to allow governments to respond to shorter term cyclical pressures (such as the GATT
￿escape clause￿ ), but such provisions by and large contemplate temporary deviations from a longer
term bargain.
To proceed with the economic analysis, our basic approach is as follows. First, we ask whether
exchange market intervention can be translated into equivalent trade policy measures ￿e.g., when
a nation intervenes in exchange markets to prevent the appreciation of its currency, what is the
e⁄ect on the world economy, and what trade policy/real (non-monetary) policy would have the
equivalent e⁄ect? As noted above, to keep our analysis simple and focused on the main points,
we take as our measure of exchange market intervention a devaluation of the intervening country￿ s
currency, brought about by an increase in its money supply, and we leave to the side any trade
balance implications of the devaluation. And we further abstract from reality by supposing for
purposes of illustration that there are just 2 countries in the world economy who produce and trade
just 2 goods and face no transport costs between them: as will become clear, the points we make do
not depend on this abstraction.26 Second, once we have identi￿ed the equivalent trade policy, we
consider at a general level what response to that policy might seem appropriate given the logic of
existing international trade agreements and the mechanisms that they have devised for the control
of trade externalities.
In a ￿ exible-price world, what trade policies would exactly replicate the e⁄ects of a currency de-
valuation? The answer to this question is a general and well-known result in international economics
(dating back to Keynes, 1931, p. 195, who ￿rst argued the point in a sticky-wage environment).
The e⁄ects of a devaluation can be replicated by the introduction of a uniform ad valorem export
subsidy on all export goods and import tari⁄ on all imported goods.27 As shall be seen, however,
the e⁄ects of such policies in tandem are dramatically di⁄erent from their e⁄ects in isolation.
To develop this idea using the example of China, we refer to our 2 countries as ￿US￿ and
￿China,￿ and we think of US as the ￿home￿ country and China as the ￿foreign￿ country. We
distinguish China magnitudes with a ￿ ￿￿ . Each country produces a specialized good ￿we denote
the good produced in US by the subscript h (for ￿home￿ ), and we denote the good produced in
China by the subscript f (for ￿foreign￿ ) ￿and trades with the other country in order to consume
both goods. Finally, we denote by $ the local currency (dollars) in US and by = Y the local currency
(RMB) in China, with the exchange rate between the US and China currencies denoted by e and
expressed as the value of the RMB in dollars (i.e., expressed as $== Y).
26For example, Helpman and Krugman (1989, Chapter 7) describe a basic model of monopolistic competition and
increasing returns to scale in which ￿rms produce many di⁄erentiated products and there is two-way trade between
countries. As they observe, the e⁄ect of trade policy in the model they describe is the same as would be the case in
a 2-good model of specialization and trade based on comparative advantage, which is in e⁄ect the model we describe
here.
27See Chipman (2006) for a demonstration of this policy equivalence under ￿ exible prices in the presence of 3 goods,
2 of which are traded, and where trade may be unbalanced. Feenstra (1985) provides an exploration of the policy
equivalence between a devaluation and a tari⁄-cum-subsidy policy in a 2-good intertemporal small-open-economy
model where agents face ￿cash-in-advance￿constraints.
9To gain an understanding of the policy-equivalence between a devaluation and the uniform tari⁄-
cum-subsidy noted above, let us suppose for the moment that there are no trade policy interventions
in the world economy. In our ￿ exible-price world, the key observation is that the price of good f
in China, denominated in RMB, which we denote by P￿= Y
f , will be related to the price of good f
in US, denominated in dollars, which we denote by P$








And similarly, the price of good h in US, denominated in dollars, which we denote by P$
h, will be
related to the price of good h in China, denominated in RMB, which we denote by P￿= Y
h , according
to the international arbitrage condition
P$
h = e ￿ P￿= Y
h : (2)
Expressions (1) and (2) are sometimes referred to as the ￿law of one price￿applied to international
markets, because they indicate that producers must receive the same price for their product, when
translated into a common currency, no matter where they make the sale.
As long as the law of one price holds (and it certainly does in the ￿ exible price environment
that we are considering at present), a devaluation of the RMB ￿which amounts to a drop in e
￿must lead to changes in the prices P￿= Y
f , P$
f , P$
h and P￿= Y
h which preserve the relationships in (1)
and (2). The question we now wish to ask is, What changes in the trade policies of China could
replicate the price changes associated with a drop in e?
To answer this question, we now express the international arbitrage conditions that re￿ ect the
law of one price as they must hold when China (i) o⁄ers an export subsidy to its exporters of good
f, expressed in ad valorem terms as a percentage of P$
f , and (ii) imposes a tari⁄on imports of good
h, expressed in ad valorem terms as a percentage of P$
h. Denoting the China export subsidy by s￿
f
and the China import tari⁄ by t￿


















￿] ￿ P￿= Y
h : (FP2)
According to (FP1) and (FP2), a drop in e would require the same adjustments to prices ￿in order
to ensure that the international arbitrage conditions hold ￿as would a uniform rise in s￿
f and t￿
h of
appropriate magnitude.28 This is the essence of the policy-equivalence between a devaluation and
a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy stated above.29
28In particular, as (FP1) and (FP2) indicate, the e⁄ects of an x% devaluation (drop in e) would be replicated by






and (1 + t
￿
h).
29A full accounting of this policy equivalence must also compare the government revenue e⁄ects of a devaluation and
a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy, but it can be shown that these e⁄ects are also equivalent (see, for example, Chipman,
10At ￿rst blush, this policy-equivalence result seems to support the argument that exchange
market intervention to lower the value of the domestic currency (intervention to reduce e in this
framework) justi￿es a trade policy response. An increase in tari⁄s in the WTO system may well
cause tari⁄s to exceed tari⁄ ceilings (￿bindings￿in WTO parlance) that have been negotiated by
the importing nation. Any time an importing nation raises tari⁄s above its negotiated bindings, it
violates WTO law unless it provides some acceptable form of trade compensation (as in the course
of tari⁄ renegotiations under GATT Article XXVIII). Likewise, export subsidies are generally pro-
hibited under WTO law outside of the agricultural sector. On the surface, therefore, a devaluation
seems equivalent to a set of policies that would represent clear infringement of WTO obligations.
This view has been expressed by a number of commentators. Consider, for example, recent
congressional testimony regarding China￿ s exchange rate policy by C. Fred Bergsten, Director of
the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Bergsten, 2007):30
[T]he administration (with as many other countries as it can mobilize) should also
take a new multilateral initiative on the trade side by ￿ling a World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) case against China￿ s currency intervention as a ￿frustration of trade
commitments￿ or as an export subsidy. As Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke indicated
in his highly publicized speech in Beijing last December, in connection with the ￿rst
Strategic Economic Dialogue, China￿ s exchange rate intervention clearly represents an
e⁄ective subsidy (to exports, as well as an import barrier) in economic terms. It should
be addressed as such.
But before we conclude that a devaluation should unambiguously be seen as a violation of WTO
commitments, we must consider the implications of price ￿ exibility. In fact, on that assumption,
a devaluation ￿as well as the equivalent uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy ￿has no real e⁄ect on any
economic magnitudes for China or any of its trading partners. This well-known proposition simply
re￿ ects the ￿long-run neutrality￿of money in a setting in which all prices are fully ￿ exible.
Intuitively, real e⁄ects require changes in relative prices, and in our 2-country 2-good world
there are 3 relative prices that together determine all the real magnitudes in the world economy:
P$
h=P$
f , the price of good h relative to the price of good f in US (measured in any common unit
of account); P￿= Y
h =P￿= Y
f , the price of good h relative to the price of good f in China (measured in
any common unit of account); and P$
h=[e￿P￿= Y
f ], the terms at which US and China trade with each
other, often referred to as the ￿terms of trade￿(again measured in any common unit of account).
Using (1) and (2) above, it may be con￿rmed in the absence of trade policy interventions in the






e ￿ P￿= Y
h









30The equivalence between a devaluation and a combination export subsidy/import tari⁄ is also highlighted as a
basis for equating undervalued exchange rates with a violation of WTO commitments in Subramanian (2008).
11and so the equality between these relative prices is una⁄ected by changes in the exchange rate
e. Moreover, given the long run neutrality of money, our ￿ exible-price environment ensures that
the devaluation of the RMB (the drop in e) will be matched by a proportional rise in both P￿= Y
h
and P￿= Y
f , and this has two implications: ￿rst, it implies that the two relative prices in (3) not
only remain equal, but also remain unchanged in response to changes in the exchange rate e; and
second, it implies that the terms of trade P$
h=[e ￿ P￿= Y
f ] is una⁄ected by changes in e as well.31 The
hypothetical devaluation thus leaves all 3 relative prices unchanged (and in fact equal to each other
under the no-trade-policy intervention assumption).32
Putting the point slightly di⁄erently, when prices are ￿ exible, a devaluation can be thought
of as simply a change in the monetary unit of account. Imagine, for example, that the Chinese
government announced that henceforth and immediately every RMB will be worth two RMB. Let
every price in the Chinese economy adjust to this change by doubling (including all wages, etc.),
while the exchange rate between the RMB and every foreign currency falls by half (each RMB
now buys half as many units of foreign currency). In this scenario, every Chinese actor would have
exactly twice as many RMB to spend, and everything would cost exactly twice as much. But
all relative prices would remain constant, and no individual would have any reason to alter their
economic behavior.33
Returning now to the equivalence between a devaluation and a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy, we
confront a crucial question: How is it that this combination of trade policy interventions ￿which
when taken separately would each distort trade and have real e⁄ects even in the ￿ exible-price
environment that we have assumed here ￿could, when packaged together, create no distortions
at all and have no real e⁄ect? The answer is that, as with a devaluation, the particular package
of trade policy interventions which is equivalent to the devaluation do not alter relative prices:
this follows as an implication of Lerner￿ s symmetry theorem (Lerner, 1936).34 The point can be
con￿rmed using (FP1) and (FP2) above, and noting that when China o⁄ers an export subsidy to
31Our discussion is predicated on the assumption that the devaluation of the RMB results from ￿unsterilized￿
intervention in the foreign exchange markets that leads to a proportional increase in the money supply in China.
In practice, many have observed that, with the aid of capital controls, China appears to be working to ￿sterilize￿
(neutralize) the impact of its exchange intervention on the Chinese money supply (see, for example, Obstfeld, 2007).
However, consistent with our focus on the trade volume e⁄ects of exchange rate intervention under the assumption
that trade remains balanced, we abstract from capital controls here. In the absence of capital controls, sterilized
intervention, as distinct from unsterilized intevention, would generally not have impacts on prices as it does not
e⁄ect the money supply; and whether ￿and if so, how ￿sterilized intervention can be e⁄ective in altering exchange
rates in this case is a matter of some controversy (see, for example, Sarno and Taylor, 2001). For the policy points
we emphasize in our economic analysis, this distinction is not central, and so we abstract from it throughout (see,
however, O￿ Connell, 1989, for an analysis of the policy equivalence between a devaluation and a uniform tari⁄-cum-
subsidy in the presence of capital controls, and the sensitivity of this equivalence to the presence of smuggling or
customs fraud).
32In the ￿ exible-price environment that we consider in this section, the lack of any relative price changes associated
with a devaluation extends as well to the non-traded goods sectors which we have implicitly ignored in the text (for
a treatment which includes non-traded goods, see Chipman, 2006).
33The same point can be (and is) made in simple macroeconomic models, where it is commonly suggested that a
devaluation can stimulate output in the short run but in the long run (when prices adjust) will simply a⁄ect the price
level. See Krugman & Obstfeld (2007, ch. 17).
34And it is here that our maintained assumption of trade balance is essential.




























These relative prices are una⁄ected by the introduction of a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy package
that satis￿es s￿
f = t￿
h. Moreover, it can be con￿rmed that a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy maintains
equality between these relative prices and the terms of trade, so that the terms of trade continues
to be given by P$
h=[e ￿ P￿= Y
f ] and is una⁄ected by the introduction of a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy
package as well.35
Intuitively, import tari⁄s and export subsidies push in opposite directions in terms of their
impacts on the production and consumption decisions of actors in an economy. As a general matter,
the export subsidy encourages resources to migrate toward the export sector, and it discourages
domestic consumption of the export good relative to the import good; an import tari⁄ encourages
resources to migrate toward the import competing sector, and it discourages domestic consumption
of the import good relative to the export good. When the two policies are of equal magnitude,
their e⁄ects exactly cancel out.
This discussion points to two potential errors in equating a devaluation with tari⁄increases and
export subsidies that would violate WTO rules. A ￿rst potential error comes from singling out a
particular component of the equivalent trade-policy package (e.g., export subsidies), and suggesting
that countries should be able to respond to that component alone. The error here is that a single
component of a policy package (say, an export subsidy) can have e⁄ects by itself that are not in any
way implied by the overall policy package. This can be seen clearly with reference to (4), where the
uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy (with s￿
f = t￿
h) has no impact on relative prices and therefore no real
e⁄ects but an export subsidy alone (with s￿
f > 0 = t￿
h) surely would.
As an analogy, suppose that the United States were to impose a new ad valorem sales tax of
10% on the purchase of automobiles, a product for which the United States is a net importer. It is
well known that the introduction of such a sales tax would have exactly the same e⁄ect as would
the introduction of a 10% tari⁄on imported automobiles combined with a 10% tax on the domestic
production of automobiles within the Unites States. Nevertheless, armed with this equivalence
result, it would clearly be misguided to think that the United States sales tax on automobiles
should be deemed to violate its tari⁄ binding on imported automobiles. To the contrary, the tax
does not alter the competitive conditions between imported and domestic products, and would in
fact be legal under WTO law as long as it did not discriminate between domestic and imported
goods.36
35In particular, as we have assumed that US maintains free trade, the terms of trade in this ￿ exible-price environ-















36The consumption tax on automobiles might conceivably support a ￿non-violation￿ nulli￿cation or impairment
claim, which permits a WTO member to bring a claim against another WTO member when the latter has taken policy
13A second potential error is more subtle: even if each component of the equivalent trade-policy
package is included, it would be wrong to argue that countries should be able to respond to each
component policy (i.e., export subsidies and import tari⁄s) as they would be able to respond in the
WTO to each of these policies when viewed in isolation. This is because, unlike the uniform export
subsidies and import tari⁄s, which as we have seen above neutralize each other in a ￿ exible-price
world and therefore have no real e⁄ects, the countervailing duty and tari⁄ responses that would
be permissible under WTO law if each of these policies were viewed in isolation can be shown to
have real e⁄ects because they reinforce ￿rather than neutralize ￿each other, and hence cannot be
viewed as o⁄setting actions in response to a devaluation in this environment.
To see this, we now express the international arbitrage conditions that re￿ ect the law of one
price as they must hold when (i) China o⁄ers an export subsidy s￿
f to its exporters of good f, (ii) in
response to s￿
f, US imposes a countervailing duty tCV D
f , (iii) China imposes a tari⁄ t￿
h on imports
of good h, and (iv) in response to t￿
h, US imposes a retaliatory tari⁄ tXXIII
h under GATT Article



















￿ (1 + tXXIII
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] ￿ P￿= Y
h : (6)
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Evidently, as can be con￿rmed with (7), these relative prices remain una⁄ected by the intro-
duction of a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy package in China that satis￿es s￿
f = t￿
h, because as we have
observed above import tari⁄s and export subsidies push in opposite directions and therefore tend
to neutralize each other in terms of their impacts on the production and consumption decisions of
actors in an economy (t￿
h enters into the denominator while s￿
f enters into the numerator of the
relative price expression in (7)). By contrast, these relative prices will be a⁄ected by the US tari⁄
responses tXXIII
h and tCV D
f , because these tari⁄ responses reinforce rather than neutralize each
other (both tXXIII
h and tCV D
f enter into the denominator of the relative price expression in (7)).
actions that frustrate the legitimate market access expectations of the former, even when those policy actions fall
outside of the explicit policy obligations negotiated in the WTO. In the ￿ exible-price world that we are considering
here, there could be no frustration of trade commitments associated with a devaluation, since there are no real
e⁄ects of the devaluation whatsoever. But in a sticky-price world of the kind we consider in the next section, the
non-violation argument might become more plausible.
14The point is, it cannot be presumed that the impacts of WTO-consistent responses to individual
policies will cancel each other out just because the impacts of the policies themselves would cancel
out, and as a consequence it is not enough to consider all components of the equivalent trade
policy package but to evaluate each component in isolation. Rather, the appropriate response to a
devaluation ￿or more fundamentally, to exchange rate misalignment ￿must be judged in light of
the overall impact of the equivalent trade-policy package.
In summary, the ￿ exible-price world we have explored here has served as a simple environment
within which to illustrate why any claim to a presumption that exchange rate misalignments violates
WTO commitments should be met with some skepticism, at least if that presumption relies on the
translation of misalignment to an equivalent set of policies that would represent clear infringement
of WTO obligations. As we have demonstrated, if not used with care, analogies drawn between
di⁄erent policy packages can lead to very misleading conclusions; and an unquali￿ed statement that
a devaluation acts like an export subsidy and hence should be countervailable under WTO rules is
certainly unwarranted.
A remaining question is whether the introduction of sticky prices will resurrect the case for a
presumption that fundamental exchange rate misalignment violates WTO commitments. As we
next demonstrate, the answer to this question appears to be ￿No.￿
3.2 Sticky prices
In the previous section we considered a ￿ exible-price world in which exchange rate intervention has
no real e⁄ects of any kind. As we demonstrated, that world is useful for establishing grounds for
broad skepticism in response to unquali￿ed claims that exchange rate misalignments are equivalent
in their impacts to policies that would violate WTO commitments. But governments that system-
atically engage in prolonged exchange rate intervention clearly believe that their intervention serves
some purpose, and thus some e⁄ects can be presumed: the question then becomes, What is the
nature of these real e⁄ects and what response do they warrant?
We now consider the possibility of exchange market intervention in an environment of sticky
prices, an assumption that plausibly captures the ￿short run.￿As might be anticipated, when prices
are sticky, devaluations can have real e⁄ects. The macroeconomic literature that concerns itself with
exchange-rate movements in a sticky-price world has focused on three di⁄erent stylized assumptions
with regard to the currency in which producers invoice their products: producer currency pricing
(PCP), in which all producers set their prices in their own currency; local currency pricing (LCP),
in which all producers set their prices in the currency of the consumers to which they sell; and dollar
pricing (DP), in which all exporters set their prices in dollars.37 Below we consider each invoicing
assumption in turn, assuming sticky prices but maintaining all other features of the 2-country
2-good model analyzed above.
37On the empirical regularities/puzzles that have given rise to interest in these three pricing assumptions and their
implications for macroeconomic modeling of exchange rate movements, see for example Engel (2002), Goldberg and
Tille (2006), Corsetti and Pesenti (2007) and Devereux, Shi and Xu (2007). For a recent attempt in this literature
to model the endogenous choice of currency invoicing, see Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005).
15Again, the goal is to identify the trade policy that is equivalent to the exchange market inter-
vention, and to consider what the proper response to that trade policy might be given the logic
of international trade agreements. Before proceeding, however, we must confront the following
conceptual question: What assumption about prices (i.e., sticky or ￿ exible) is to be made when
evaluating the impact of the equivalent trade policies?
One possible approach is to maintain the assumption of fully ￿ exible prices when evaluating
the impacts of trade policy. Under this approach, we would seek to identify the combination of
trade policies which, if introduced in the ￿ exible-price environment of the previous section, would
have exactly the same impact as a devaluation in a sticky-price environment. One might defend
this approach on the grounds that although exchange rate movements occur at a frequency for
which a sticky-price assumption seems plausible, the relative infrequency of trade policy changes
suggests that a ￿ exible-price assumption is more appropriate for evaluating their e⁄ects. Moreover,
the purpose to which we wish to put our equivalence results is that of assessing the proper WTO
response to trade policies that have equivalent e⁄ects to a devaluation, and as we have discussed
above the time frame for action within the WTO is typically a period of years over which a ￿ exible
price assumption is perhaps more plausible. Notice, though, that this approach has an immediate
implication ￿a devaluation with real e⁄ects cannot be deemed equivalent to a uniform tari⁄-cum-
subsidy, as some commentators seem to suggest, because as we have already seen the introduction
of such a trade policy package has no real e⁄ects in a ￿ exible-price world.
The alternative approach is to adopt the sticky-price assumption when evaluating the impacts
of trade policy and searching for trade policies which would have equivalent e⁄ects to a devaluation
under sticky prices. Under this approach, we seek to identify the combination of trade policies
which, if introduced into the same sticky-price environment as the devaluation, would have exactly
the same impact as the devaluation. We will focus our analysis below on this approach, because
it is the only approach that can possibly deliver the equivalence of a devaluation to a uniform
tari⁄-cum-subsidy when the devaluation has real e⁄ects, and because a main focus of our analysis
in this section is to scrutinize the oft-stated equivalence between a devaluation and a uniform tari⁄-
cum-subsidy and assess the robustness of this equivalence in the presence of sticky prices under
the various assumptions about the currency of invoicing. But it should be kept in mind that, in
light of the conceptual question raised above, the equivalence between a devaluation and a uniform
tari⁄-cum-subsidy in a sticky-price environment is even more tenuous and subject to quali￿cation
than our subsequent analysis suggests.
3.2.1 Producer Currency Pricing
When prices are fully ￿ exible, it does not matter in which currency a producer invoices its products.
But when prices are sticky and must be set before the relevant exchange rate level is realized, the
currency of invoicing is important. We begin our sticky-price analysis by adopting the assumption
(most prominently utilized by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 1995, 1996) that producers invoice their prod-
16ucts in their own currency (￿producer currency pricing,￿or PCP).38 Throughout we will consider
the impact of exchange rate movements that are unanticipated by all agents, so when we refer to a
devaluation this should be interpreted to mean that the level of the exchange rate e turns out to be
lower than that anticipated at the time when prices were set. Similarly, in light of our discussion
above and our decision to adopt the sticky-price assumption when evaluating the impacts of trade
policy and searching for trade policies which would have equivalent e⁄ects to a devaluation under
sticky prices, the equivalent trade policies should also be interpreted as changes in trade policies
relative to those anticipated at the time when prices were set.39
Prior to analyzing this case formally, it is useful to give the basic intuition. Producers set their
prices in their home currency, such that their returns from sales ￿when translated into a common
currency ￿are the same everywhere (the law of one price holds). An unanticipated devaluation
of the RMB then occurs, so that the price of the U.S. export rises in RMB, and the price of the
Chinese export falls in dollars. The ratio of the price of the U.S. good to the Chinese good thus rises
in any common currency, inducing some expenditure switching between them. As shall be seen,
it is possible to replicate this outcome once again with a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy combination
imposed by China. But this e⁄ect di⁄ers from the e⁄ects of ordinary protectionist policies such
as tari⁄s, in that the prices of each good across the two markets remain the same in any currency
(there is no wedge driven between them). Notice also that from the U.S. perspective, the terms of
trade improve (the value of the U.S. export relative to the Chinese import rises in any common
currency). In traditional trade models in which governments act as national income maximizers,
such a development would represent a welfare gain for the United States.
We now proceed to develop these points more formally. Under the assumption that all exporting
￿rms (in China and US) pre-set prices in their own currency (PCP) before they know the exchange
rate at which their sale will be made (and under the sticky price assumption cannot then alter
their price for these sales once the level of the exchange rate is known), the pricing relationships in
(FP1) and (FP2) ￿and therefore the law of one price ￿will still hold. The only di⁄erence in these




f and P￿= Y
h are not: in particular, P$
f and P￿= Y
h move one-to-one with the exchange
rate e, and similarly P$
f moves one-to-one with s￿
f while P￿= Y
h moves one-to-one with t￿
h. Hence, the
incidence of changes in e, s￿
f and t￿
h fall entirely on P$
f and P￿= Y
h in this sticky-price PCP setting.
Letting ￿ P￿= Y
f denote the preset (sticky) level of the price of good f in China, denominated in
38We focus here on sticky prices, but similar points could be made in a sticky-wage setting. For example, in
the sticky-wage model analyzed by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002), a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) demand
structure is assumed, and with labor as the only component of marginal cost this implies that sticky wages (in the
producer￿ s currency) result in sticky prices (in the producer￿ s currency) because the CES demand structure implies
that prices are a constant markup over marginal cost. The implication is then that, for the points we emphasize here,
the sticky-wage setting is analogous to the sticky-price setting with PCP invoicing.
39Speci￿cally, under PCP the producer sets the price for the period in terms of its own currency before seeing
the level of the exchange rate for that period, and so it is the importer price (in the importer￿ s own currency) that
changes with the realized exchange rate. By analogy, in characterizing the equivalent trade policies we are therefore
assuming here that it is the importer price that changes with the realized trade policies, and we ask what realized
trade policies would be equivalent to a realized exchange rate.
17RMB, and letting ￿ P$
h denote the preset (sticky) level of the price of good h in US, denominated

















￿] ￿ P￿= Y
h : (PCP2)
Hence, as (PCP1) and (PCP2) con￿rm (in the same way that (FP1) and (FP2) con￿rmed in the
￿ exible-price environment), the policy equivalence between a devaluation and a uniform tari⁄-cum-
subsidy continues to hold in a sticky-price world when producers invoice according to PCP.
Notice that the only di⁄erence between (PCP1) and (FP1) is that, in the event of a devaluation
of the RMB, ￿ P￿= Y
f remains ￿xed while P$
f adjusts to ensure that (PCP1) continues to hold. Similarly,
the only di⁄erence between (PCP2) and (FP2) is that, in the event of a devaluation of the RMB, ￿ P$
h
remains ￿xed while P￿= Y
h adjusts to ensure that (PCP2) continues to hold. This di⁄erence, though,
carries with it an important implication that distinguishes the sticky-price PCP environment from
the ￿ exible-price world: in a sticky-price environment under the PCP assumption, a devaluation of
the RMB (a drop in e) ￿or equivalently the introduction of a uniform (t￿
h = s￿
f) tari⁄-cum-subsidy
￿now raises the price of good h relative to the price of good f in both US and China, as well as
the terms of trade between them, and hence has real e⁄ects.























￿ ￿ P￿= Y
f
: (8)
It is direct from (8) to con￿rm that the introduction of a uniform (t￿
h = s￿
f) tari⁄-cum-subsidy


















Evidently, a devaluation (drop in e) ￿ or equivalently the introduction of a uniform (t￿
h = s￿
f)
tari⁄-cum-subsidy ￿preserves the equality across all three relative prices (the relative price in US,
the terms of trade, and the relative price in China are given respectively by the ￿rst, second and
third expressions in (9)) but raises these relative prices to a higher level (as indicated by the middle
expression in (9)), and this implies a real e⁄ect. In particular, there is an ￿expenditure switching￿
impact of the devaluation, as consumers in US and China respond to the increase in the price of
good h relative to the price of good f by shifting expenditure away from the US export good h and
toward the China export (US import) good f.
Once again we may now ask: Does the policy equivalence between a devaluation and a uniform
18tari⁄-cum-subsidy ￿ which we have shown holds in a sticky-price environment when producers
invoice according to PCP ￿support the argument that exchange market intervention to lower the
value of the domestic currency justi￿es a trade policy response, at least if the sticky-price PCP
environment provides a reasonable approximation of empirically relevant conditions? We suggest
several reasons that the answer to this question may be ￿No.￿
First, as we have observed above and as can be con￿rmed from (9), the uniform tari⁄-cum-
subsidy implied by the RMB devaluation does not introduce a wedge between relative prices in US
and China. Therefore, the traditional ine¢ ciency (dead weight loss) associated with the use of trade
policy and comprising the central focus of trade negotiations is not present under the expenditure-
switching e⁄ects of a devaluation. Moreover, as noted above, the terms of trade between US and
China are altered as a result of the China devaluation, but this movement implies an improvement
in the US terms of trade and a worsening of the China terms of trade, which runs counter to
the direction of the terms-of-trade externality that is traditionally associated with ine¢ cient trade
policy protection.40 Hence, while the equivalence between a devaluation and a uniform tari⁄-cum-
subsidy remains valid in the presence of sticky prices and the PCP assumption, the application of
this equivalence to serve as a guide for WTO action is not straightforward, because the nature of the
international problems created by the devaluation are not analogous to the international problems
traditionally addressed by trade agreements.41
A second quali￿cation comes from an examination of the pricing relationship in (PCP1), and
relates to the incidence issues noted above. In particular, we now emphasize an important implica-
tion of the PCP assumption in the presence of sticky prices: the implicit export subsidy associated
with the hypothetical devaluation of the RMB is captured completely by consumers in the rest of
the world. That is, when prices are sticky and the PCP assumption holds, none of the implicit
export subsidy associated with a devaluation is collected by the exporters. This simply re￿ ects the
fact that, under the PCP assumption, exports are invoiced in the currency of the producer prior to
the realization of the exchange rate, and so if the producer￿ s currency is subsequently devalued it is
the foreign consumers who experience the drop in price (in their own currency).42 This observation
has some important legal implications that we will consider in Section 4.
40On the ine¢ ciency created by di⁄erences in relative prices across countries and the interpretation of the central
purpose of trade negotiations as seeking to eliminate these ine¢ ciencies, see Mayer (1981) and Bagwell and Staiger
(2002, Ch. 2). As Bagwell and Staiger explain, according to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, it is the
pursuit of terms-of-trade improvements in a non-cooperative setting that leads countries to adopt trade policies that
result in wedges between their respective relative prices that are ine¢ ciently large from an international perspective,
regardless of their underlying reasons for trade policy intervention: it is then the purpose of trade agreements to
reduce the magnitude of these price wedges to internationally e¢ cient levels.
41Recall too that we have already restricted our focus to trade volume e⁄ects of devaluations as opposed to trade
balance e⁄ects, and still the nature of the problem looks quite di⁄erent from that traditionally handled by trade
agreements such as the GATT/WTO.
42At the same time, it should be pointed out that while none of the implicit subsidy is collected by exporters
from China, the implied increase in export sales may still increase the pro￿ts of exporters from China (measured
in local currency), if the price at which these sales are made exceeds the per-unit cost of the additional production
required to meet the additional export demand. However, the magnitude (and potentially even the sign) of any pro￿t
e⁄ects associated with a given implicit subsidy level would depend on industry features such as market structure and
production technologies.
19Finally, it bears emphasis once again that, for the purposes of this analysis, we have sought
to identify the combination of trade policies which, if introduced into the same sticky-price envi-
ronment as the devaluation, would have exactly the same impact as the devaluation. However, for
the reasons described previously, it is not clear that this is the only relevant thought experiment
for our purposes. And under the alternative approach in which the assumption of fully ￿ exible
prices would be maintained when evaluating the impacts of trade policy, we have already noted
that a devaluation with real e⁄ects cannot be deemed equivalent to a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy
in our formal model, because the introduction of such a trade policy package has no real e⁄ects
in a ￿ exible-price world. This adds a further layer of caution to treating an equivalence between
devaluations and uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy packages as a guide for WTO action.
3.2.2 Local Currency Pricing
We next continue our sticky-price analysis by adopting the assumption (utilized, for example, by
Betts and Devereux, 2000) that producers invoice their products in the currency of the consumers
to which they sell (￿local currency pricing,￿or LCP).43 In combination with the assumption that
￿rms pre-set prices before they know the exchange rate at which their sale will be made (and under
the sticky price assumption cannot then alter their price for these sales once the relevant exchange
rate is known), the assumption of LCP implies that the pricing relationships in (1) and (2) ￿and
therefore the law of one price ￿will no longer hold.44
Again it is useful to set out some intuition and basic results before proceeding with the formal
exposition. Producers in this case set their export prices in the currency of their foreign customers,
while setting their domestic prices in their home currency. Initially, those prices are set such that
the returns expected from sales in each market are the same. But then an unanticipated devaluation
occurs, and producers cannot adjust their prices. U.S. exporters now earn fewer dollars on their
Chinese sales (the RMB is worth less), while Chinese exporters now earn more RMB on their U.S.
sales (the dollar is worth more). Here, the ratio of prices in each currency remains the same as before
the devaluation and there is no expenditure switching. But the terms of trade have improved for
China because its exporters now earn more RMB on each sale, while U.S. exporters earn fewer
dollars. In this situation, the equivalent trade policy turns out to be a tari⁄ only; there is no role
for an export subsidy.
43Under LCP the producer sets the export price for the period in terms of the importer￿ s currency before seeing
the level of the exchange rate for that period, and so it is the exporter price (in the exporter￿ s own currency) that
changes with the realized exchange rate. By analogy, in characterizing the equivalent trade policies we are therefore
assuming here that it is the exporter price that changes with the realized trade policies, and we ask what realized
trade policies would be equivalent to a realized exchange rate.
44The fact that PCP predicts that the law of one price should hold at an international level even when prices are
sticky while LCP predicts that it should not suggests a compelling way to choose between the two assumptions about
the way that producers invoice for international transactions. In fact, there is a large body of empirical evidence (see
Engel, 2002, for review of this literature) suggesting that the law of one price fails dramatically at the international
level, which is why macroeconomists have been interested in studying pricing assumptions beyond PCP such as LCP
(and DP, which we consider in the next subsection) that do not imply the law of one price. (See, however, Broda and
Weinstein, 2007, for a contrary view regarding the empirical failure of the law of one price at the international level).
20To elaborate, under LCP the producer of good f in China sets a price invoiced in RMB for
local sales (in China), ￿ P￿= Y
f , and a price invoiced in dollars for sales in US, ￿ P$
f , before the realization








] ￿ ￿ P$
f : (LCP1)
As (LCP1) indicates, under LCP it will generally not be true that a ￿rm in China will earn the
same from the export sale of good f to US, when translated into RMB and inclusive of the export
subsidy s￿
f, as it does from the sale of good f in the local (China) market. Notice too that, with
￿ P$
f pre-set before the level of e or s￿
f is known, the incidence of e and s￿
f fall completely on the
China exporter of good f.
Similarly, under LCP the producer of good h in US sets a price invoiced in dollars for local
sales (in US), ￿ P$
h, and a price invoiced in RMB for sales in China, ￿ P￿= Y
h , before the realization of







￿] ￿ ￿ P￿= Y
h : (LCP2)
As (LCP2) indicates, under LCP it will generally not be true that a ￿rm in US will earn the same
from the export sale of good h to China, when translated into dollars and netting out the import
tari⁄ t￿
h, as it does from the sale of good h in the local (US) market. Note also that, in this case,
with ￿ P￿= Y
h pre-set before the level of e or t￿
h is known, the incidence of e and t￿
h fall completely on
the US exporter of good h.












neither of which is sensitive to a devaluation (a drop in e) or the introduction of export subsidies
or import tari⁄s (under the assumption, recall again, that the subsidies and tari⁄s are introduced
into the same sticky-price environment as the devaluation). This indicates that, under LCP, there
is no expenditure switching e⁄ect of a devaluation. Intuitively, this is because, as observed above,
under the LCP assumption prices in each country are pre-set in the local currency prior to the
realization of the exchange rate, and so a devaluation can have no impact on the relative prices
faced by consumers in either country, as con￿rmed by (LCP3a) and (LCP3b).
21What is sensitive to a devaluation is the terms of trade, which in the case of LCP is given by
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as well as the actual terms at which exporters trade when translated into a common currency,
which if the law of one price held would be equal to the terms of trade but which in the case of
LCP (where the law of one price is violated) is given by
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Notice the di⁄erence between the terms of trade given in (LCP3c) and the actual terms at which
exporters trade given in (LCP3d): the China export subsidy s￿
f appears in the denominator of
the latter but does not appear in the former. This re￿ ects that fact that, as noted above, the
incidence of s￿
f falls completely on the China exporter of good f in the LCP setting (and under the
assumption, recall again, that the subsidies and tari⁄s are introduced into the same sticky-price
environment as the devaluation), and so s￿
f is not included when expressing the terms of trade
between the two countries (which is de￿ned to re￿ ect the ￿world￿prices at which the countries
trade) but is included when expressing the actual terms at which exporters trade.45
As (LCP3a) through (LCP3d) indicate, when prices are sticky and producers invoice according
to LCP, a relationship between a devaluation and a real (trade) policy equivalent can again be
identi￿ed. In this case, though, the e⁄ects of the devaluation (drop in e) can be replicated by
an appropriate increase in t￿
h alone: a drop in e would have an equivalent impact on each of the
relative prices in (LCP3a) through (LCP3d) as would an increase in t￿
h of appropriate magnitude.
Evidently, when producers invoice according to LCP, there is no role of any kind for a China export
subsidy s￿
f in the trade policy package that would replicate the e⁄ects of a devaluation.
In sum, as re￿ ected in the relative price expressions above, when prices are sticky and producers
invoice according to LCP, a devaluation impacts only the terms of trade and the terms at which
exporters trade, and it has no impact on the relative prices faced by consumers in the United States
or China. An increase in the China import tari⁄ t￿
h can by itself replicate these impacts. But an
increase in the China export subsidy s￿
f can only impact the terms at which exporters trade; a
China export subsidy cannot impact the terms of trade in this setting because, as observed above,
the incidence of s￿
f falls entirely on exporters from China, and so it is as if China is a ￿small￿
country with respect to its export subsidy in this setting. For this reason, when prices are sticky
and producers invoice according to LCP, there is no role of any kind for a Chinese export subsidy
s￿
f in the trade policy package that would replicate the e⁄ects of a devaluation.
45If the law of one price held, this would imply that the expressions in (LCP1) and (LCP2) would be equalities, and
using these equalities the expression in (LCP3d) can be shown to be equivalent to the expression in (LCP3c). But
since the law of one price is violated under LCP, the expression in (LCP1) and (LCP2) are in general inequalities,
and hence the expressions in (LCP3d) and (LCP3c) will in general be di⁄erent.
22Recalling now our earlier ￿ndings under the assumption of PCP, where the equivalence between
a devaluation and a uniform tari⁄-cum-subsidy package was con￿rmed, we arrive at an important
conclusion: characterizing the equivalent trade policy package that would replicate the e⁄ects of a
devaluation in a sticky-price environment hinges critically on whether PCP or rather LCP is the
most appropriate assumption. Moreover, observe in this case that, in contrast to standard tari⁄
analysis, there are no direct trade e⁄ects (no expenditure switching) associated with either the
devaluation or its equivalent real trade policy package.46 Hence, even if one could be con￿dent that
LCP is the empirically relevant assumption, relying on an analogy between a devaluation and an
equivalent trade policy package ￿ in this case tari⁄s ￿and then invoking the usual e⁄ects of tari⁄s
as a reason that the WTO should be spurred into action seems misguided here as well.
3.2.3 Dollar Pricing
Finally, we adopt the assumption that producers invoice their products for export in dollars (￿dollar
pricing￿or DP). This assumption captures the idea that world export prices tend to be set in a
￿vehicle￿ currency only (see Goldberg and Tille, 2006, for a review of evidence supporting this
assumption). In our 2-country model, the vehicle currency is necessarily the currency of one of the
two trading countries, and more generally this feature need not be true (i.e., the vehicle currency
could be a third-country currency). Nevertheless, our 2-country setting is su¢ cient to illustrate
the central points that arise when producers invoice in a vehicle currency, and so we proceed under
the assumption that the vehicle currency is dollars.
This case is a combination of the two above. U.S. exporters are pricing in their own currency,
while Chinese exporters are pricing in the local currency of their customers. The unanticipated
devaluation then has no impact on the dollar earnings of U.S. exporters on foreign sales, but
increases the returns to Chinese exporters in RMB. No expenditure switching occurs in the United
States (the ratio of dollar prices remains constant), and from the U.S. perspective the terms of
trade remains ￿xed. All of the impact of the devaluation is felt in China, where there is some
expenditure switching toward the export good. This e⁄ect can again be replicated by a tari⁄ on
Chinese imports, but not by an export subsidy ￿the subsidy would have no impact on the sticky
Chinese export price.
To elaborate, under the assumption that all exporting ￿rms pre-set prices in dollars (DP) before
they know the exchange rate at which their sale will be made (and under the sticky price assumption
cannot then alter their price for these sales once the relevant exchange rate is known), the pricing
relationship in (PCP2) will continue to hold but the pricing relationship in (PCP1) will not: rather,
for this second pricing relationship, the inequality in (LCP1) is relevant. This can be understood by
46There are real e⁄ects of the devaluation under LCP in a sticky-price environment, because the devaluation does
alter some relative prices, namely, the terms of trade given by (LCP3c) and the actual terms at which exporters
trade given by (LCP3d), and these relative price changes will, respectively, redistribute income across countries (from
US to China) and redistribute pro￿ts across agents (from US exporters to China exporters). But the expenditure
switching (redirection of demand) that is a central feature of standard tari⁄ analysis is absent when producers invoice
according to LCP.
23noting that the assumption of DP is asymmetric: it behaves as PCP for the (dollar denominated)
US, but it behaves like LCP for (RMB denominated) China.








] ￿ ￿ P$
f ; (DP1)
implying that the law of one price does not hold for Chinese exporters and that, with ￿ P$
f pre-set
before the level of e or s￿
f is known, the incidence of e and s￿
f fall completely on the China exporter







￿] ￿ P￿= Y
h ; (DP2)
implying that the law of one price holds for US exporters and that, with ￿ P$
h pre-set before the level
of e or t￿
h is known, the incidence of e and t￿
h fall completely on P￿= Y
h .
Hence, under sticky prices and DP, the relative prices faced by consumers in US are insensitive
to a devaluation (a drop in e) or the introduction of China export subsidies or import tari⁄s (under
the assumption, recall again, that the subsidies and tari⁄s are introduced into the same sticky-price






On the other hand, consumers in China face the relative prices
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which are sensitive to a devaluation. As a result, (DP3a) implies that there will be no expenditure
switching e⁄ects in the US in response to a China devaluation (a drop in e) when producers invoice
according to DP, but (DP3b) implies that there will be expenditure switching e⁄ects in China.















As (DP3a) through (DP3c) indicate, when prices are sticky and producers invoice according
to DP, a bridge between a devaluation and a real (trade) policy equivalent can again be forged.
24In this case, though, as was shown to be the case also under the LCP assumption, the e⁄ects of
the devaluation (a drop in e) can be replicated by a proportional increase in t￿
h: again, there is
evidently no role for export subsidies in the equivalent trade policy package in this environment.
In sum, as re￿ ected in the relative price expressions above, when prices are sticky and producers
invoice according to DP, a devaluation impacts only relative prices faced by consumers in China, and
it has no impact on the terms of trade, the terms at which exporters trade, or relative prices faced
by consumers in US. An increase in the China import tari⁄ t￿
h can by itself replicate these impacts.
But an increase in the China export subsidy s￿
f impacts the terms at which exporters trade, and it
cannot impact the relative price faced by consumers in China; this is because, as observed above,
the incidence of s￿
f falls entirely on exporters from China (and for Chinese exporters the law of
one price does not hold). For this reason, when prices are sticky and producers invoice according
to DP, there is no role of any kind for a China export subsidy s￿
f in the trade policy package that
would replicate the e⁄ects of a devaluation.
This ￿nding for DP invoicing augments and reinforces the conclusion we drew above in the
context of our analysis of LCP: characterizing the equivalent trade policy package that would replicate
the e⁄ects of a devaluation in a sticky-price environment hinges critically on whether PCP or rather
LCP or DP is the most appropriate assumption.
3.3 Summary
In light of our sticky-price analysis in Section 3.2 and the ￿ exible-price analysis of Section 3.1
that preceded it, we now feel justi￿ed in drawing the following broad conclusion: the introduction
of sticky prices does not resurrect the case for a presumption that fundamental exchange rate
misalignment violates WTO commitments, a presumption that was shown to be unwarranted in a
￿ exible-price environment. Rather, whether prices are taken as ￿ exible or sticky, the translation
and interpretation of the impacts of a devaluation into an equivalent set of trade policy actions
is fraught with complexity, and ultimately can only be judged once a variety of subtle empirical
questions are answered and the context of the particular legal claims being made at the WTO is
spelled out. We now turn to a legal analysis of the possible claims.
4 Legal Analysis
As we documented earlier, o¢ cials in both Washington and Brussels are harsh critics of China￿ s ex-
change rate policies, primarily on the grounds that they distort trade ￿ ows. The economic analysis
above makes clear, however, that the e⁄ects of currency misalignment or manipulation on inter-
national trade are di¢ cult to ascertain with con￿dence. The extent of any currency misalignment
is controversial, and no agreement exists on the proper way to measure it. Further, and less ap-
preciated to date, the e⁄ect of misalignment on trade (whether the result of ￿manipulation￿ or
not), however it is measured, is uncertain and variable over time. Short-term e⁄ects will depend
on such factors as the pricing policies of exporters, and will tend to decay over the long term as
25prices adjust. Consequently, the e⁄ects of exchange market intervention on trade would be extraor-
dinarily di¢ cult to quantify. The economic welfare implications are also dependent on a variety of
factors, and there is little reason to think that trading partners su⁄er systematic net harm (using
the traditional measure of economic welfare) as a result of misalignment or manipulation.
Because China￿ s exchange market practices have led to a number of proposals for action against
China that are now pending, we proceed in this section to review and assess the possible options
from an economic and legal standpoint. As shall be seen, the options vary considerably in their
potential e¢ cacy, in the practical challenges associated with their implementation, and in their
legality under international law.
4.1 Multilateral Options
4.1.1 IMF Action
Legal Principles The IMF was conceived primarily to assist in the management of a system
of ￿xed exchange rates.47 But its obligations go considerably beyond that function, and it was
recognized at the time of the founding that unilateral exchange market intervention might have
worrisome consequences for other members. Accordingly, Article IV(1)(iii) of the Articles of Agree-
ment of the IMF provides in pertinent part: ￿each member shall...avoid manipulating exchange
rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent e⁄ective balance of payments ad-
justment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.￿The Articles did not
de￿ne the term ￿manipulation,￿however, or the term ￿unfair competitive advantage.￿
To make these obligations e⁄ective, Article IV(3) provides that the Fund ￿shall oversee the
international monetary system in order to ensure its e⁄ective operation, and shall oversee the
compliance of each member with its obligations under [Article IV(1)].￿The oversight of each mem-
ber￿ s policies pursuant to this language is known as ￿bilateral surveillance.￿In practice, bilateral
surveillance involves an assessment of the policies of each member by the IMF sta⁄, followed by
consultations between the IMF and the monetary authorities of the member. The sta⁄ will convey
to the member the results of its analysis on issues such as whether a fundamental misalignment
exists, sometimes on a qualitative and sometimes on a quantitative basis.48
For many years, this process proceeded with little o¢ cial guidance as to the exact content of
the obligations under Article IV(1)(iii). In response to calls for more speci￿city within the IMF,
a June, 2007 decision of the IMF Executive Board provides some interpretative analysis.49 Annex
IV of that decision de￿nes ￿manipulation￿as ￿policies that are targeted at ￿and actually a⁄ect
￿the level of an exchange rate. Moreover, manipulation may cause the exchange rate to move or
may prevent such movement.￿Regarding the concept of unfair advantage, the Annex goes on to
state that:
47See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The Rules of the Game (University of Chicago Press 1982).
48See IMF, Treatment of Exchange Rate Issues in Bilateral Surveillance ￿A Stocktaking, August 30, 2006b.
49IMF, Bilateral Surveillance over Member￿ s Policies, Executive Board Decision, June 15, 2007b.
26￿a member will only be considered to be manipulating exchange rates in order to
gain an unfair advantage over other members if the Fund determines both that: (A) the
member is engaged in these policies for the purpose of securing fundamental exchange
rate misalignment in the form of an undervalued exchange rate and (B) the purpose of
securing such misalignment is to increase net exports.￿Thus, a touchstone for manip-
ulation is an e⁄ort to in￿ uence the balance of trade. A determination whether such an
e⁄ort has been undertaken is to be based on ￿an objective assessment...based on all
available evidence, including consultation with the member concerned. Any representa-
tion made by the member regarding the purpose of its policies will be given the bene￿t
of any reasonable doubt.￿
As noted in the above-quoted passage, ￿manipulation￿also requires a ￿fundamental misalign-
ment.￿A companion sta⁄ paper to the 2007 Board decision describes ￿fundamental misalignment￿
as a situation where ￿the underlying current account￿(de￿ned in a footnote as the actual current
account stripped of cyclical forces) di⁄ers from the ￿equilibrium current account￿and the discrep-
ancy is ￿signi￿cant.￿That is, the real exchange rate must be such that the balance of payments
situation facing a member is signi￿cantly at odds with situation that it would face from some
long-term macroeconomic equilibrium perspective.50
Implications With regard to the current controversy over China￿ s exchange practices, the details
of IMF surveillance and sta⁄conversations with China are not public. It does appear that the sta⁄
has suggested to China that its currency su⁄ers from misalignment, but had not (as of 2006)
attempted to quantify its extent.51 Any in￿ uence that IMF discussions may have had on Chinese
policy are unclear, and likewise non-public, but the perceived problem clearly has not been resolved.
The question arises whether an aggrieved IMF member can achieve more under IMF auspices.
The IMF lacks a formal dispute resolution mechanism akin to that of the WTO, but members may
raise concerns about the practices of other members informally before the sta⁄ or formally before
the Executive Board. Issues raised by economically powerful members will most likely receive
particular attention, and indeed it is often suggested that the wealthy countries e⁄ectively run the
IMF.52 Hence, if major players such as the United States and the EU were to raise concerns about
China￿ s practices at the IMF (they have likely done so already), the Board and the sta⁄ will no
doubt pay heed to such concerns in the process of bilateral surveillance.
For three reasons, however, the bilateral surveillance process is unlikely to have much in￿ uence
on the exchange practices of a country such as China. First, as a legal matter, a violation of Article
IV(1) is quite di¢ cult to demonstrate. Under the interpretation of Article IV set forth above,
manipulation to achieve an unfair advantage occurs only if a member engages in practices ￿for
the purpose￿of creating fundamental misalignment in the form of an undervalued exchange rate,
50IMF, Review of the 1997 Decision ￿Proposal for a New Decision Supplement, June 13, 2007c.
51See IMF, Treatment of Exchange Rate Issues in Bilateral Surveillance ￿A Stocktaking, August 30, 2006b.
52See Hector R. Torres, Reforming the International Monetary Fund ￿Why Its Legitimacy is at Stake, 10 J. Int￿ l
Econ. L. 443-60 (2007).
27and where the attendant ￿purpose￿is to secure an increase in net exports. Thus, the member￿ s
intention must be established with respect to both of these criteria. And in assessing intent, the
member is to be given ￿the bene￿t of any reasonable doubt.￿A nation such as China will surely
have a plausible case that the requisite showing of ￿intent￿cannot be made under this standard,
and that its purpose in pegging the RMB is instead to maintain macroeconomic stability through
a sound monetary policy. Indeed, distinguished Western economists have defended Chinese policy
on precisely those grounds.53
Second, even if Chinese policies could be found to violate Article IV under the applicable
legal standard, the history of bilateral surveillance suggests a strong emphasis in the IMF on the
avoidance of confrontation, at least when powerful countries are involved. The 2007 Board decision
emphasizes that ￿[d]ialogue and persuasion are key pillars of e⁄ective surveillance.￿ The Fund￿ s
￿assessments and advice are intended to assist that member in making policy choices, and to
enable other members to discuss these policy choices with that member.￿Plainly, the conception
of the process is far from that of an adversarial dispute process, and much more grounded on the
objectives of persuasion and consensus. Indeed, Michael Mussa reports that the number of bilateral
consultations pursuant to Article IV since its rati￿cation is in excess of forty thousand. Yet, ￿in
none of these consultations has the Executive Board ever concluded that a member was out of
compliance with its obligations regarding its exchange rate policies or any other matter.54￿
Finally, and related, the IMF has little practical leverage over a nation such as China. In
principle, members of the IMF can be punished for violations through a curtailment of their access
to the resources of the Fund, suspension from membership or even expulsion,55 but there is no hint
in the 2007 Board decision that such sanctions will enter the surveillance process in any serious way
and no history of them being employed against ostensible violators of Article IV(1)(iii), as Mussa
indicates. In modern IMF practice, the primary coercive device is the threat that a member may
be cut o⁄ from IMF borrowings if it does not pursue the appropriate policies (the controversial
practice of ￿conditionality￿in IMF lending). A country such as China, however, with trillions of
dollars in foreign exchange reserves, has no need to borrow from the IMF and no serious prospect
of such a need in the foreseeable future. As Hector Torres suggests, such countries ￿feel insulated
from the Fund￿ s criticism.56￿
In sum, if one were to believe that exchange market intervention by China is the source of an
important ￿problem,￿the IMF as it presently operates seems an unlikely solution. The weak legal
standards under Article IV, the emphasis on non-confrontational consensus building within the
IMF, and the absence of credible sanctions for disregarding IMF advice leads us to doubt that the
IMF can do much to in￿ uence the behavior of a member such as China.
53See Ronald McKinnon, Why China Should Keep Its Exchange Rate Pegged to the Dollar: A Historical Perspective
from Japan, October, 2006 (mimeo).
54Michael Mussa (2007), IMF Surveillance over China￿ s Exchange rate Policy (Peterson Institute of Economics
October 19, 2007).
55See IMF Art. XXVI. Such sanctions have played some role historically in cases involving the failure of a member
to meet its repayment obligations to the Fund.
56Torres (2007), p. 450.
28We recognize that this conclusion may seem at odds with the assumption we have stated earlier,
to the e⁄ect that the IMF is the proper venue for addressing trade-balance issues and that it is
not a ￿failed institution.￿To the degree that readers reject this assumption for the reasons we give
above or others, however, this simply provides a reason to reform the IMF, not a reason to abandon
it. And in any event, it does not immediately follow that the WTO is the proper institution to take
over the tasks of the IMF. As we have demonstrated at length in Section 3, the task of translating
exchange practices into trade policies with equivalent e⁄ect is fraught with uncertainty and depends
greatly on the time frame within which one operates. The substantive rules of the WTO, and its
calibrated retaliation system, do not seem well suited to this task for reasons introduced above that
we will now elaborate further.
4.1.2 WTO Action
Mindful of the limitations of the IMF, a number of proposals in Washington, as well as a number
of commentators,57 would seek a solution at the WTO. The possible options under WTO law
are essentially three: a complaint based on GATT Article XV, a complaint predicated on the
notion that Chinese practices amount to an impermissible export subsidy, and a ￿nonviolation￿
complaint.58
Article XV The relationship between the GATT and the IMF is the subject of GATT
Article XV. Its focus is on the circumstances in which GATT members may use trade measures for
balance of payments purposes, such as the use of quotas to constrain imports to conserve scarce
foreign exchange, a practice that would violate GATT Article XI in the absence of a bona ￿de
balance of payments problem (see GATT Article XII). Article XV was drafted to encourage and
facilitate coordination between GATT and the IMF on issues such as the question whether a GATT
member employing quantitative restrictions for ostensible balance of payments purposes is doing
so legitimately.59
But Article XV addresses more than just the use of trade measures for balance of payments
purposes. In particular, Article XV(4) states that members ￿shall not, by exchange action, frustrate
the intent of the provisions of this Agreement.￿
Nothing in Article XV or elsewhere in GATT provides clear guidance, however, as to what
sorts of exchange practices would frustrate its intent.60 Likewise, Article XV(4) has never been
57See Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New
Role for the World Trade Organization (Peterson Institute Working Paper WP 08-2, January, 2008).
58For another skeptical assessment of the WTO options from a legal standpoint, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Yee
Wong and Ketki Sheth, US-China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes, Policy Analyses in International
Economics 78 (2006), chapter 2.
59See note 1 supra for some cases in which such issues arose.
60Ad Article XV does provide that practices which deviate from the letter of GATT do not frustrate it if there
is no ￿appreciable departure￿from its intent. The use of import licenses as part of a system of exchange controls
that is acceptable under IMF rules, for example, would not violate GATT Article XI (concerning the prohibition of
quantitative restrictions). Although Ad Article XV thus delineates some practices that would not frustrate the intent
of GATT, it is of little assistance in identifying practices that would frustrate its intent.
29interpreted by the WTO/GATT dispute system, and no case law exists on the question of what
exchange practices would frustrate the intent of GATT. Plainly, however, the heart of the GATT
bargain has always been the market access commitments associated with the tari⁄ bindings under
Article II. A powerful argument can be made that any exchange action that frustrates these market
access commitments would qualify as a potential violation under Article XV. In addition, modern
WTO law (through the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures) embodies a general
prohibition on export subsidies.61 If the obligation of Article XV is interpreted to encompass the
frustration of these other WTO obligations, an argument can be made that any exchange practice
that amounts to an export subsidy is also a potential violation of GATT Article XV.
As discussed at length earlier, a familiar claim about China￿ s exchange policies is that they
produce the equivalent of an across the board tari⁄ increase, coupled with an across the board
export subsidy. We have raised a number of questions about this claim in Section 3, but to the
degree that it has any validity, it a⁄ords a plausible basis for an Article XV claim.
In adjudicating such a claim the WTO dispute process is obliged to defer to the IMF on certain
issues. Article XV(2) states that in all cases addressing ￿problems concerning monetary reserves,
balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements,￿GATT members must consult with the
IMF and ￿shall accept all ￿ndings of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating to
foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall accept the determination
of the Fund as to whether action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.￿Thus, to the degree that a violation
of GATT Article XV was thought to depend on the existence of a violation of Article IV(1) of the
IMF Agreement, for example, the WTO would be obliged to defer to any determination by the
Fund as to the existence of such a violation.
It is by no means clear, however, that a violation of GATT Article XV requires a violation of
IMF Article IV(1). It is possible to imagine, for example, that exchange action might ￿frustrate the
intent￿of GATT even if it fell short of ￿manipulation￿for the ￿purpose￿of increasing net exports
under IMF standards. Among other things, nothing in the notion of measures that ￿frustrate the
intent￿of GATT necessarily requires that such measures be undertaken deliberately to frustrate
the intent of GATT. Perhaps it would be enough to violate GATT Article XV if exchange practices
had the e⁄ect of causing or perpetuating a signi￿cantly undervalued exchange rate, and if that
situation in turn could be shown to impair market access commitments or yield the equivalent of
export subsidization.62
But this last observation returns us full circle to the economic issues discussed in Section 3. To
the degree that a nation such as China maintains an exchange rate peg for an extended period of
time, prices may be expected to adjust and the real e⁄ects of the exchange intervention will decay
to zero. Furthermore, when one recognizes that any litigation in the WTO is likely to take several
61GATT Article XVI also contains some more limited obligations restricting export subsidies.
62Moreover, even if a linkage between violation of GATT Article XV(4) and IMF Article IV(1) were thought to be
required, Article XV seemingly leaves the WTO free to make its own judgment if the Fund proved unable to make a
determination.
30years to resolve, there is even more reason to believe that the real e⁄ects of past Chinese policies
may wash out through price changes as the case works its way through the process.
In the short run, the analysis is also complicated. Recall that, despite continued exchange
market intervention, the RMB has in fact been appreciating (slowly) against the dollar over the
past few years. The sticky price results we developed earlier assumed an unanticipated devaluation,
yet there has in fact been no recent devaluation (against the dollar), and it would be di¢ cult to
argue that Chinese practices are unanticipated of late. To the extent that price stickiness is creating
real e⁄ects nevertheless, the precise nature of those e⁄ects would depend, among other things, on
how goods are priced. In the PCP case, for example, an unanticipated devaluation does induce
some expenditure switching in China from the import good toward the export good, which might
be interpreted as an impairment of U.S. market access for its export good. Yet, as we have observed
in Section 3, the traditional ine¢ ciency (dead weight loss) associated with the use of trade policy is
not present in this case, and the terms of trade for the United States improve, the opposite of the
injurious e⁄ect on terms of trade that modern economic theory imagines to be the basis for trade
agreements. Could it fairly be said that such a situation frustrates the intent of GATT? Likewise,
the short-term economic e⁄ects of intervention are not the same as those of a simple export subsidy
as we have indicated. Hence, a complaining nation under GATT Article XV ￿which would have the
burden of proof to make out a prima facie violation ￿could well have a di¢ cult time establishing
that China￿ s practices, at the time of the proceeding, were in fact having real e⁄ects that amounted
to a ￿frustration of the intent￿of GATT.
Export Subsidization On the premise that government intervention to produce an under-
valued exchange rate is the equivalent of an across the board export subsidy, some commentators
have suggested that a WTO complaint might challenge China￿ s policies as illegal export subsi-
dization. Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs), ￿subsidies￿
contingent on export performance are indeed prohibited.
It is quite unclear, however, whether exchange practices that lower the value of the national
currency can qualify as a ￿subsidy.￿Under SCMs Article 1, a necessary condition for the existence
of a subsidy is ￿a ￿nancial contribution by a government or any public body,￿or else some form
of ￿income or price support.￿In addition, such a measure must confer a ￿bene￿t.￿Finally, under
SCMs Article 2 the subsidy must also be ￿speci￿c.￿
The speci￿city requirement is met if exchange market intervention can indeed be characterized
as an export subsidy ￿i.e., as a subsidy ￿contingent upon export performance.￿Article 2.3 provides
that all such subsidies are ￿speci￿c.￿Exchange market intervention, of course, does not expressly
confer bene￿ts on ￿rms ￿contingent￿on their export performance. All ￿rms will operate in the
environment of an altered exchange rate irrespective of their export performance. A respectable
argument might be made, however, that an undervalued exchange rate tends to favor exporting
￿rms if it has any real e⁄ects at all (assuming that prices have not adjusted to o⁄set it). Even if
not formally contingent on export performance, therefore, any export stimulus resulting from an
31undervalued exchange rate is plausibly characterized as an export subsidy.
The greater hurdles are perhaps posed by the requirements of SCMs Article 1. Article 1.1 lists
several types of possible ￿￿nancial contributions￿￿direct transfers of funds by government, a gov-
ernment practice that foregoes revenue otherwise due, government provision of goods and services,
or government payments to a funding mechanism to carry out one of these three functions.63 One
(unappealed) WTO panel report held that this list is exhaustive, and that government practices
that are not among the enumerated items are not subsidies even if they provide an economic bene￿t
to an industry. Thus, the panel concluded, government restrictions on exports, which depress their
price and allow domestic industries that use the exported products as inputs to obtain them more
cheaply, cannot qualify as subsidies ￿they do not involve a direct transfer of funds, they do not
represent revenue foregone, and they do not entail government provision of goods or services.64
Plainly, exchange transactions by the government do entail a ￿direct transfer of funds￿to entities
trading in the foreign exchange market. But these entities are not, in general, Chinese exporters,
and a further question is whether the ￿￿nancial contribution￿must be made to the purportedly
subsidized entity (Chinese exporters). Plainly, China￿ s participation in the exchange market does
not, in general, involve a ￿nancial transaction with domestic exporters.65 An argument can be
made, however, that a direct transfer to exporters is not required. Nothing in the text requires
it. Further, it is well-settled that subsidies may arise ￿upstream￿in a chain of production, and
be passed downstream in the form of lower prices from input suppliers (the softwood lumber case
provides a nice example, where below market prices for timber harvesting rights are said to result in
a subsidy to sawmills una¢ liated with the harvesters). To be sure, exchange market transactions do
not in general involve input suppliers, but one might nevertheless argue that the upstream subsidies
cases establish that the subsidized entity need not directly transact with the government. As long
as there is a transaction involving the transfer of funds, and a ￿bene￿t￿arises, one might argue
that a subsidy exists.
An alternative argument for the existence of a ￿￿nancial contribution￿is the suggestion that
the government may forego revenue as the result of exchange intervention. A recent countervailing
duty petition ￿led against Chinese imports by U.S. producers of ￿ exible magnets alleges that when
China lowers the value of the RMB, it makes imports more expensive and thus foregoes tari⁄
revenue when imports are elastically demanded.66 Once again, Chinese exporters are not a direct
bene￿ciary of any such situation ￿any revenue foregone is not owed to the government by them ￿
63Of course, a ￿nancial contribution is not essential ￿ a subsidy may instead result from an ￿income or price
support.￿ This term has not yet been interpreted in dispute resolution, and conceivably might be read broadly
to encompass anything that boosts the income of the purportedly subsidized entity. Such a broad interpretation,
however, would clash with the ￿nding in United States ￿Export Restraints that export restraints cannot constitute
subsidies. And if the term ￿income or price support￿receives a narrow reading, limiting it to programs speci￿cally
geared to such matters (as in the agricultural sector), exchange market transactions would not appear to qualify.
64United States ￿Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, adopted August 23, 2001 (not
appealed).
65In any case where exporters directly exchange foreign currency with the Chinese government for RMB, of course,
a ￿direct transfer of funds￿would surely be present.
66See Inside U.S. Trade, Vol. 25 No. 38, September 28, 2007, p. 22.
32but perhaps this di¢ culty can be overcome for the reason given above. The economic soundness
of the suggestion that exchange practices reduce revenue, however, is open to question. Clearly, in
the long run, price adjustments eliminate this e⁄ect. In the short run, with local currency pricing
(Chinese imports priced in RMB), devaluation has no impact on Chinese tari⁄ revenues (all ad
valorem tari⁄s or speci￿c tari⁄s yield the same revenue in RMB per unit of imports as before and
all import prices in RMB remain the same). With producer currency pricing or dollar pricing, by
contrast, Chinese imports do become more expensive in RMB so that consumers may buy fewer
of them. But the question whether net tari⁄ revenue rises or falls depends on the elasticity of
import demand ￿China might well earn more tari⁄ revenue if demand elasticity is su¢ ciently low
on average.
Even if a ￿￿nancial contribution￿ can somehow be found, however, it remains to determine
whether exchange practices confer a ￿bene￿t.￿This issue also returns us to the economic analysis
of the last section. Certainly, no bene￿t exists if prices have adjusted to eliminate all real e⁄ects
of the practice. Likewise, one might argue that no bene￿t exists if the exporter does not realize an
increase in pro￿ts or income as a result of the practice, as in the case of producer currency pricing
when an unanticipated devaluation allows the purchaser of the good and not the seller to realize
all the gains. And in the case of local currency or dollar pricing, the translation of exchange rate
practices into real policy equivalents leaves no role for export subsidies, as we have observed.
Of course, one can imagine exchange practices in which an export subsidy might readily be
found. Suppose, for example, that a government allows exporters to exchange foreign currency
earned from export sales for domestic currency, and in the process gives them an amount of domestic
currency that exceeds the fair market value of the foreign currency that they exchange for it.
But that is simply not the type of transaction at issue in the case of China. For these reasons,
an argument that China￿ s practices confer an impermissible export subsidy is certainly open to
question.
Nonviolation Nulli￿cation or Impairment The nonviolation doctrine under WTO law
allows member nations to advance claims that a foreign practice, otherwise permissible under WTO
law, frustrates reasonable market access expectations associated with tari⁄concessions. In contrast
to practices that violate WTO law, a member whose measures become the basis for a successful
nonviolation complaint has no obligation to withdraw the measures, but must nevertheless provide
compensation or su⁄er a prospect of retaliation.67
If one assumes that China￿ s exchange market practices cause the equivalent of a tari⁄ increase
on Chinese imports ￿an assumption that is questionable given the analysis in Section 3 above ￿
perhaps it might be argued that China￿ s practices impair the reasonable market access expectations
associated with China￿ s negotiated tari⁄bindings, even if they do not otherwise violate WTO rules.
For several reasons, however, it seems unlikely that the nonviolation doctrine could be successfully
invoked with respect to China￿ s exchange practices.
67See WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Art. 26.
33First, the nonviolation doctrine serves to ￿ll ￿gaps￿in WTO obligations. The classic example of
a nonviolation claim involves the introduction of a new, WTO-legal domestic subsidy to domestic
producers who compete with imports of goods that are the subject of tari⁄ bindings. But WTO
law directly addresses exchange practices that ￿frustrate the intent￿of GATT, as discussed above
in connection with GATT Article XV. China would thus have a strong argument any claim that
its exchange practices upset reasonable expectations is properly adjudicated under Article XV.
Second, the nonviolation doctrine has been used sparingly over WTO/GATT history. The
handful of successful cases, mostly many years ago, all involved new subsidy practices or changes in
tari⁄ classi￿cations.68 The extension of the concept to macroeconomic practices that a⁄ect market
access opportunities would be a radical departure, and would raise potentially worrisome issues
about how the nonviolation concept could be contained properly.69
Finally, the nonviolation doctrine only protects reasonable market access expectations, and
expectations are not ￿reasonable￿if the measure that ostensibly impairs them was expectable at
the time of the relevant tari⁄ negotiations. At the time of China￿ s accession to the WTO in 2001,
China pegged its currency to the dollar and the RMB has only appreciated since that time. It would
be di¢ cult for China￿ s trading partners to make a case that they could not reasonably expect China
to have continued its exchange policy after its accession.
4.2 Unilateral Options
4.2.1 Bilateral Negotiations
The outgoing Bush administration has consistently favored diplomatic solutions to the currency
dispute with China, and has resisted moves to pursue multilateral or unilateral trade measures.
While the administration apparently concurs in the view that the RMB is signi￿cantly undervalued,
and concurs in the view that it results in trade detriment to the United States, it also evidently
believes that sterner measures would prove counterproductive.
One negotiating tool at the disposal of the administration, that it has not employed to date,
relates to an oversight role of the Treasury Department under the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988. Section 124 of that Act, codi￿ed at 22 U.S.C. §5304, requires the Treasury
Department to conduct an annual evaluation of the exchange practices of foreign countries, and
to consider whether other countries are ￿manipulating￿ their currency in the sense of the term
as used in IMF Article IV(1). If it determines that manipulation is present, it is then required
to initiate expedited negotiations with the country in question (unless they would threaten ￿vital
national economic and security interests￿ ) either bilaterally or under the auspices of the IMF. To
68See John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan O. Sykes, International Economic Relations 5th ed. (Thompson
West: 2008), chapter 7.
69During negotiations over the charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1946, there was some
discussion of the possibility that weak macroeconomic conditions might create conditions of "nulli￿cation or impair-
ment" (presumably because export opportunities would prove lacking). Language was added to the proposed charter
to accommodate this concern. See Hudec (1990), pp. 38-39. Of course, the ITO never came into being and, as
noted in the text, the claim that macroeconomic weakeness might cause nulli￿cation or impairment has never been
advanced in the history of GATT or the WTO.
34date, Treasury has declined to determine that China has manipulated its currency, in part because
it has not found that China meets the ￿intent￿requirement found in IMF Art IV(1).70 The lat-
est Treasury Department report on exchange rates, released December 10, 2008, again declined to
name China as a currency manipulator.71
Among the recent proposals on Capitol Hill is legislation that would alter the standard for
￿nding manipulation under the 1988 Act.72 The proposed legislation would require Treasury to
￿nd manipulation by any country with ￿material￿global and ￿signi￿cant￿bilateral trade surpluses,
if that country has engaged in ￿prolonged one-way intervention in the currency markets.￿Under
this standard, which dispenses with any need for a ￿nding regarding ￿intent,￿Treasury would have
little choice but to ￿nd China to be a ￿manipulator,￿and to then pursue the expedited negotiations
contemplated by the 1988 Act.
Of all the pending proposals, this option is least problematic from a legal perspective, in that it
requires no action that is questionable under WTO law, and remains respectful of IMF principles.
It merely ￿turns up the political heat￿on Treasury and on China by forcing Treasury to make a
public determination that it has heretofore been unwilling to make. The harder question, which
we do not purport to answer, is whether such a move would make it more likely or less likely that
China will accede to pressure to allow the RMB to appreciate, and whether more rapid appreciation
of the RMB will on balance bene￿t the U.S. economy.
4.2.2 Countervailing Duties
As discussed above, if Chinese currency practices can indeed be characterized as measures that
amount to export subsidization, the possibility of a WTO complaint for violation of the SCMs
Agreement arises. As an alternative to a complaint before the WTO, however, an importing
nation whose import-competing industries are ￿materially injured￿by the export subsidization or
threatened with such injury has the right under WTO law to impose additional duties (termed
￿countervailing duties￿ ) to o⁄set the export subsidization.
Such a policy must confront a number of legal and practical issues. U.S. law was interpreted for
many years to preclude the use of countervailing duties against exports from non-market economies.
The agency charged with administering the law, the Department of Commerce, reasoned that
the extensive entanglement of the government with economic activity in a non-market economy
makes it impossible to identify subsidies in meaningful fashion. In 2007, however, the Department
reversed its position with respect to China, and held that China￿ s economy had developed to the
point that it was possible to apply countervailing duty law.73 The Department maintains that it
has the discretion to make this change in policy, but to eliminate any legal uncertainty in that
regard, various bills have been introduced on Capitol Hill that would explicitly authorize the use
70See http://www.dnrnews.com/site/article.php?id=233
71See BNA International Trade Daily, December 16, 2008.
72See S. 1677 (110th Congress).
73Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People￿ s Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 17484 (April 9, 2007).
35of countervailing duties against non-market economy exports under U.S. law.74
Even if U.S. law allows countervailing duties in the case of an economy such as China, however,
other obstacles remain. First, for the reasons discussed earlier, it is hardly clear that exchange
practices confer ￿subsidies￿within the meaning of that term under WTO law. Any decision by the
United States to apply countervailing duties on the basis of exchange practices would likely con-
front a WTO challenge, focusing on the question whether exchange practices satisfy the ￿￿nancial
contribution￿and ￿bene￿t￿requirements of SCMs Article 1. Likewise, it is hardly clear that U.S.
law can be interpreted in such a way as to treat currency practices as a countervailable subsidy,
although some of the proposals in Washington would amend U.S. law to cover currency practices.75
Second, countervailing duties are limited to situations in which subsidized import competition is
causing or threatening ￿material injury￿to a competing domestic industry. That test is not trivially
satis￿ed, and the demonstration of material injury requires a costly proceeding before the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) to analyze the injury question for any ￿industry￿in which
countervailing duties are contemplated. Moreover, a countervailing duty may do little to bene￿t
an import-competing industry. Among other things, because a countervailing duty remedy will
apply only to imports from a subsidizing nation, it may have no bene￿ts to the import-competing
industry if a highly elastic supply of imports from other countries is available at a comparable
price. It is thus quite unclear how many industries would elect to bear the costs and uncertainties
of pursuing a countervailing duty remedy, and unclear how many could succeed if they do.
Finally, the use of countervailing duties requires that the magnitude of any subsidy be quanti￿ed.
In light or the economic analysis in Section 3, accurate quanti￿cation of the extent to which currency
practices translate into an equivalent export subsidy seems a Herculean task. The di¢ culties
associated with that task would add further fodder to any WTO challenge that might be brought
against the use of countervailing duties.
For all of these reasons, the countervailing duty option is open to question, although we must
acknowledge one ￿countervailing￿ consideration. Because countervailing duties are a unilateral
policy, they can be imposed for a time without incurring any formal international sanction even if
they would later prove to be illegal under WTO law. Accordingly, for at least a few initial industries,
they might a⁄ord a way to ratchet up the pressure on China to relax its currency practices on at
least a transitory basis.
4.2.3 Antidumping Duties
Another proposal for unilateral action put forward in Washington would alter U.S. antidumping
law to treat currency misalignment as a source of dumping. The legislation would thus empower
the Department of Commerce to impose additional antidumping duties against imports from coun-
tries with misaligned currencies if the ITC determined that such dumped imports were causing or
threatening to cause material injury to a competing domestic industry.
74E.g., H.R. 708, H.R. 1229, H.R. 2942, S. 364, S. 974 (all 110th Congress).
75E.g., H.R. 782, H.R. 2942, S. 364 (all 110th Congress).
36The e⁄ects of currency misalignment would be included in the dumping calculation as an adjust-
ment to the price charged for merchandise in the Untied States. For example, one much-discussed
bill provides that if a nation is found to have a ￿fundamentally misaligned￿currency, de￿ned as a
￿sustained deviation...from its medium term equilibrium level,￿if the misalignment results from
certain types of government policies (such as prolonged one-way intervention in exchange markets),
and if the nation in question has not adopted ￿appropriate policies￿to correct the situation within
90 days, then:
The administering authority [Department of Commerce] shall ensure a fair com-
parison between the export price and the normal value by adjusting the price used to
establish export price or constructed export price to re￿ ect the fundamental misalign-
ment of the currency of the exporting country.76
The details of how the adjustment would be performed are not speci￿ed in the legislation, but
presumably the ￿export price￿would be adjusted downward by the amount of ￿misalignment,￿so
that when it is compared to the ￿normal value￿for purposes of calculating a dumping margin, any
margin of dumping would automatically increase by the amount of ￿misalignment.￿This adjustment
would apparently be made regardless of how the exports are priced (in producer currency or local
currency, for example), and regardless of the basis for establishing normal value (whether home
market price, third-country price, or constructed value).77
Like the countervailing duty option, this type of response to currency misalignment will have
purchase only in industries where the material injury can be satis￿ed, and where ￿rms are willing
to bear the costs of bringing cases. Such a policy is also highly questionable under WTO law.
Dumping is a ￿rm-level behavior, whereby exporting ￿rms o⁄er better prices in one market (where
dumping occurs) than to customers in the home or a third country market, or where sales are made
below ￿cost￿ (understood to be something approximating long run average cost, not short run
variable cost). Such behavior is simply lacking under circumstances contemplated by the proposed
legislation. Suppose that a Chinese ￿rm sells a widget for 10RMB at home (F.O.B.), and sells
an identical widget to the United States for 10RMB (F.O.B.), consistent with the PCP invoicing
assumption considered in Section 3. From the ￿rm￿ s perspective, it has realized identical amounts
from each transaction, but under the proposed legislation, the ￿export price￿would be found to
be less than the ￿normal value.￿ A ￿nding of ￿dumping￿ under these circumstances would do
considerable violence to the concept of dumping, and might well be said to violate the requirement
in the WTO Antidumping Agreement that a ￿fair comparison￿be made between the export price
and normal value (Article 2.4).
76S. 1607, §6(1)(A) (110th Congress).
77￿Dumping￿ under WTO law involves sales in which the ￿export price￿ is below ￿normal value.￿ The normal
value is ordinarily the home market price of the same or similar merchandise (adjusted for any di⁄erences in the
merchandise) at the same level of trade (normally the ex-factory level). When insu¢ cient home market sales exist, or
such sales are made below cost, prices to an ￿appropriate￿third country may be used instead. When third-country
prices cannot be used either, constructed value will be employed, which is de￿ned as ￿cost of production￿ plus a
reasonable allowance for general, selling and administrative expense and pro￿t. See WTO Antidumping Agreement,
Article 2.
37Article 2.4 also provides that when the comparison requires a conversion of currencies (not
necessary in the example above because both products are assumed to be priced in RMB), the
exchange rate shall be the ￿rate of exchange on the date of sale.￿ This language can be read
to refer to the actual exchange rate, not some counterfactual ￿medium term equilibrium￿ rate.
Indeed, as we indicated in Section 3, it is questionable whether there exists any predictable and
stable relationship between the exchange rate that achieves an ￿equilibrium￿trade balance, however
that concept is de￿ned, and the amount by which exchange market intervention a⁄ects the real
prices of goods in international trade.
Finally, if currency misalignment is to be treated as a source of dumping, the thorny problem of
quantifying the misalignment resurfaces, as under the countervailing duty option. The di¢ culties
in performing this task convincingly would no doubt create further legal vulnerability.
5 Conclusion
Individual governments may engage in exchange rate intervention for a variety of reasons. The
key question for the world trading system is how other governments and/or international economic
institutions should respond to the international e⁄ects of this intervention. There are important
circumstances under which such intervention has no real e⁄ects of any kind, in which case it is
clear that no response is warranted. On the other hand, governments that systematically engage
in prolonged exchange rate intervention clearly believe that their intervention serves some purpose,
and in this case real e⁄ects can be presumed: the question then becomes, What is the nature of
these real e⁄ects and what response do they warrant?
We have argued in this paper that the potential international e⁄ects of exchange rate policies
can be usefully divided into two kinds: e⁄ects on trade balances; and e⁄ects on trade volumes. We
have observed that the e⁄ects of exchange rate policies on trade balances is the traditional concern
of the IMF, and we have adopted the view in this paper that the IMF is capable of carrying out
its role in this regard. From this starting point, we have then asked how the WTO might address
￿either through multilateral action or by facilitating unilateral action ￿the possible impacts of
exchange rate policies on trade volumes.
As we have noted, in maintaining the assumption that the IMF is the appropriate institution
for addressing the impacts of exchange rate policies on trade imbalances, our paper cannot speak
to all corners of the policy debate on currency manipulation, because some in this debate argue
that the IMF is a failed institution and that the WTO should be called upon to achieve what the
IMF cannot: this of course would imply a fundamental shift in the limits of the WTO mandate.
By contrast, our economic and legal analysis presumes that there will be no fundamental change
in the role of the WTO. Nevertheless, even with this more limited focus, our paper still speaks to
one very important dimension of the policy debate, namely, whether and under what circumstances
exchange rate policies can be seen to either impair WTO commitments or to be a speci￿c basis for
WTO-consistent unilateral responses.
38Our economic and legal analysis raises numerous questions about the notion that exchange rate
misalignments violate WTO commitments or could reasonably form the basis for WTO-consistent
unilateral responses. Rather, whether prices are taken as ￿ exible or sticky, the translation and
interpretation of the impacts of a devaluation into an equivalent set of trade policy actions is
fraught with complexity, and ultimately can only be judged once a variety of subtle empirical
questions are answered.
We have used a ￿ exible-price setting, in which the real-policy equivalents of a devaluation are
most clear, to illustrate the pitfalls with singling out a particular component of the equivalent real-
policy package or viewing each of the components in isolation when evaluating possible WTO- or
WTO-consistent responses. And we have shown in a sticky-price setting that the identi￿cation of
the real-policy equivalents to a devaluation are highly sensitive to the details of pricing behavior.
The welfare e⁄ects of undervaluation on other nations are also complex and dependent on a
variety of considerations. It is highly misleading to equate them to the e⁄ects in isolation of tari⁄
increases and export subsidies for the reasons we have discussed.
In sum, the task of untangling the complex relationship between exchange practices and trade
is thus fraught with uncertainty, a fact that suggests caution in assessing claims that China￿ s ex-
change practices are frustrating the WTO bargain, or that China￿ s practices a⁄ord an economically
or legally sound basis for unilateral actions such as antidumping or countervailing duties. Unilat-
eral responses of the latter sort are perhaps the most problematic of all the proposed policies,
in that the task of translating Chinese exchange practices into a quantitatively equivalent export
subsidy (for countervailing duty purposes) or reduction in export price (for antidumping purposes)
seems exceedingly di¢ cult, and certainly cannot be based on existing estimates of "misalignment"
generated by conventional models of equilibrium exchange rates.
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